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ARTICLE III AND REMOVAL JURISDICTION:  THE 
DEMISE OF THE COMPLETE DIVERSITY RULE AND A 
PROPOSED RETURN TO MINIMAL DIVERSITY 
RODNEY K. MILLER∗ 
Abstract 
The complete diversity rule is broken.  Although easily applied in theory 
(federal courts can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over an action on 
diversity grounds only when no party is of the same citizenship as any 
adverse party), over time the number of judicially and legislatively created 
exceptions to the rule, as well as their varying and inconsistent application 
by the federal courts, has created an environment in which similarly 
situated parties are treated differently based solely on the forum in which 
the litigation is brought. 
In the removal context, depending upon the forum in which an action is 
filed, a federal court may exercise diversity jurisdiction over a matter 
despite the presence of a nondiverse party where, for example, the 
defendant can show the plaintiff lacks a viable claim against the nondiverse 
party, or the plaintiff has improperly joined the claims of nondiverse parties 
to a completely diverse action, or, in mass actions, the plaintiffs have 
proposed trying the joined actions together (but not if they have not).  In 
response, the federal judiciary (despite having brought this problem on 
itself through its myriad conflicting rulings on the subject) has cried out for 
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order—requesting a revision to the current diversity jurisdiction regime that 
provides both uniformity in treatment and ease of application. 
This article proposes the adoption of a minimum diversity standard for 
all matters between citizens of different states.  This proposal is supported 
by Article III of the Constitution and its framers.  Further, it is easy to 
apply, and largely incapable of manipulation.  To ensure, however, that this 
change does not flood the courts with diversity matters, this article further 
proposes an increase to the amount-in-controversy requirement to bring it 
into the twenty-first century, along with a mandatory abstention provision 
precluding the federal courts from hearing matters local in nature. 
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I. Introduction 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. . . .1  The judicial Power 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of 
different States . . . .2 
This plan appears to me at present the most eligible of any that 
could be adopted; and in order to [implement] it, it is necessary 
that the power of constituting inferior courts should exist in the 
full extent in which it is to be found in the proposed 
Constitution.3 
The framers expressed an intent that the federal courts be open to all 
cases and controversies “national” in nature: specifically, all controversies 
involving citizens of different states.4  Over time, however, the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts has turned the 
simple and easily applied concept of diversity jurisdiction as it was first 
envisioned into something that would be virtually unrecognizable to the 
founding fathers.  Focusing on removal as a proxy for the larger issue, 
federal diversity jurisdiction today is applied inconsistently (some might 
argue arbitrarily) and suffers from myriad complex judicially and 
legislatively created exceptions to the complete diversity requirement.  
Consequently, it is subject to brazen gamesmanship between the parties—
often with the court’s imprimatur—to avoid or manufacture federal 
jurisdiction.  Nowhere is this more evident than in mass tort litigation.  
Consider the following six hypothetical situations, and determine which, if 
any, are removable from state to federal court on diversity grounds:5 
1. Forty-nine individuals, each a resident of a state diverse from 
the others,6 join together and bring a single product liability 
lawsuit against a defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer 
alleging injuries sustained from the use of defendant’s 
prescription medication.7  The defendant drug manufacturer is 
                                                                                                                 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean ed., ABA 
2009) (1788) (emphasis added). 
 4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 3, at 461-63 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of 
the Union ought to extend to . . . causes between two States, between one State and the citizens 
of another, and between the citizens of different States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 5. In making your assessment, presume for each hypothetical that the amount-in-
controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is met. 
 6. The term “state” as used in these hypothetical scenarios shall connote only the fifty 
states of the United States. 
 7. For purposes of these hypothetical scenarios, disregard whether the claims of the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
272 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:269 
 
 
diverse in citizenship from the forty-nine plaintiffs (i.e., it is a 
citizen of the fiftieth state of the union, of which none of the 
plaintiffs is a citizen).  Plaintiffs file their complaint in a state 
court in a state different from the one in which defendant is a 
citizen. 
2. The same group of plaintiffs from the first hypothetical again 
joins together and brings a single product liability lawsuit against 
a diverse defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer alleging 
injuries sustained from the use of defendant’s prescription 
medication.  This time, however, the plaintiffs name a second 
defendant (a pharmaceutical distributor), which has the same 
citizenship as one of the forty-nine plaintiffs.  Although the 
distributor did, in fact, distribute the medication at issue, 
plaintiffs do not allege that the distributor prescribed, sold, or 
supplied the medication to any of the named plaintiffs in the suit, 
nor to the physicians who treated them.  Plaintiffs file their 
complaint in a state court in a state in which neither of the named 
defendants is a citizen. 
3. Fifty individuals, each a resident of a state diverse from the 
others, join together and bring the same lawsuit as proposed in 
the first hypothetical, against the same defendant.  This time, 
however, the defendant drug manufacturer is necessarily a 
citizen of the same state as one of the fifty plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs 
file their complaint in a state court in a state different from the 
one in which defendant is a citizen. 
4. Ninety-nine individuals, citizens of numerous states of the 
union, join together and bring the same lawsuit as proposed in 
the first hypothetical, against the same defendant.  At least one 
of the plaintiffs, but not all, is a citizen of a state different from 
the one in which defendant claims citizenship.  Plaintiffs file 
their complaint in a state court in a state different from the one in 
which defendant is a citizen. 
5. One hundred individuals, citizens of various states of the 
union, join together and bring the same lawsuit as proposed in 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiffs suffice to meet the joinder requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 
the applicable procedural rules of the states in which they are filed.  The question of the 
propriety of joinder in the above hypothetical scenarios will be assessed subsequently in this 
text.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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the first hypothetical, against the same defendant.  At least one 
of the plaintiffs, but not all, is a citizen of a state different from 
the one in which defendant claims citizenship.  Plaintiffs file 
their complaint in a state court in a state different from the one in 
which defendant is a citizen. 
6. The same one hundred individuals from the fifth hypothetical 
band together in groups of twenty and file five separate lawsuits 
against the same defendant.  At least one of the plaintiffs in each 
of the five suits, but not all, is a citizen of a state different from 
the one in which defendant claims citizenship.  The allegations 
in each of the five lawsuits are identical.  Plaintiffs file all five 
complaints in the same state court and on the same date.  The 
court in which the complaints are filed sits in a state different 
from the one in which defendant is a citizen. 
So, which suits can be removed to federal court?  The answer to the 
question, a response familiar to all first-year law students, is: “It depends.”  
But the very fact that there is no clear answer to the question goes to the 
heart of the issue: the complete diversity model for federal diversity 
jurisdiction, whatever its original intentions, is fundamentally broken.   
Under the current landscape, the baseline criterion for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction premised on diversity grounds8 (and removal founded on 
that premise9) mandates that no party can be of the same citizenship as any 
adverse party—colloquially referred to as the complete diversity rule.10  
Based on this rule and the allegations of citizenship in the hypothetical 
situations, only the complaint in the first hypothetical can be removed to 
federal court.  Arguably, the analysis should end there.11  But it does not. 
                                                                                                                 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (c) (2006). 
 9. Id. § 1441(a), (b). 
 10. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (establishing the 
complete diversity requirement). 
 11. See, e.g., Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005).  In 
Harris, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that removal premised on 
diversity jurisdiction presents one of three possible scenarios: 
1) the case clearly is removable on the basis of jurisdictional facts apparent 
from the face of the complaint, i.e., complete diversity of citizenship; 2) the 
case clearly is not removable on the basis of jurisdictional facts apparent from 
the face of the complaint, i.e., lack of complete diversity; or 3) it is unclear 
from the complaint whether the case is removable, i.e., the citizenship of the 
parties is unstated or ambiguous. 
Id. at 692-93.  Because none of the complaints in the remaining hypothetical situations 
presents complete diversity of citizenship between adverse parties, the Harris rule would 
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First, federal courts have carved out an exception to the complete 
diversity requirement that allows for removal of any case to which a 
nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined to defeat federal subject 
matter jurisdiction.12  A defendant commonly will prove fraudulent joinder 
by demonstrating an “inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action 
against the non-diverse party in state court.”13  Relying on this doctrine, the 
defendant in the second hypothetical situation might be able to remove the 
matter to federal court after all, despite the absence of complete diversity on 
the face of the complaint.  Because the proposed nondiverse defendant in 
that example had no contact with the plaintiffs, nor the physicians who 
prescribed the medications at issue, there would likely be “no reasonable 
basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff[s] might be able to 
recover against” the nondiverse defendant supplier.14  The outcome is less 
than definitive, however, as the rule is inconsistently applied across the 
federal district courts.15  As a result, the ultimate outcome will turn on the 
state in which the suit is filed. 
Second, some federal district courts, along with at least one (and 
possibly two) U.S. circuit courts of appeals, have upheld (or likely would 
uphold) removal despite the addition of nondiverse plaintiffs where the 
claims of the plaintiffs bear no relationship to each other.16  This doctrine, 
known as “misjoinder” or “fraudulent misjoinder” of claims, addresses the 
following situation: although all plaintiffs named in a single complaint 
could potentially have viable claims against the named defendant or 
defendants, those claims are not sufficiently similar such that they can be 
joined together in a single action under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
or the analogous rules of procedure of the state in which the suit is 
originally brought.  Preliminarily, then, the matter presented in the third 
hypothetical situation might also be removable.  But the misjoinder doctrine 
has not been universally adopted.17  Moreover, the standards imposed by 
the courts to determine whether misjoinder has occurred vary among 
jurisdictions that employ the rule.18  Again, these inconsistencies in 
                                                                                                                 
preclude removal. 
 12. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 572-73 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 13. Id. at 573 (quoting Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 646–47 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 17. See infra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 95, 97–104 and accompanying text. 
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adoption and application of the rule prevent uniformity in treatment across 
the jurisdictions of the United States of similar, national suits. 
Third, in addition to judge-made exceptions to the complete diversity 
rule, Congress has also muddied the waters by enacting legislation that does 
away with the complete diversity requirement in certain, specific 
circumstances.19  Of particular note, in 2005, Congress enacted the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA),20 which provides in part that so-called mass 
actions can be removed from state to federal court so long as “any 
[plaintiff] is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”21  Congress, 
for the first time, firmly adopted on a large scale the minimal diversity 
requirement originally proposed by the framers more than two hundred 
years earlier.22  To qualify as a mass action, however, a suit must (1) join in 
a single action the claims of one hundred or more plaintiffs, (2) propose that 
the claims be tried jointly, (3) involve common questions of law or fact, and 
(4) must be a matter in which the amount in controversy exceeds 
$5,000,000.23  Therefore, assuming for the sake of argument that the 
amount in controversy is met, the complaint in the fifth hypothetical 
situation above can be removed to federal court.  Incongruously, however, 
the subtraction of a single plaintiff (the fourth hypothetical situation) or 
artificiality in pleading the identical case (the sixth hypothetical) precludes 
removal. 
It is in the rationale for denying removal in this last hypothetical 
situation that uniformity in interpretation and application of the rules on 
diversity jurisdiction has finally become unworkable—contrary to both 
legislative intent and the framers’ vision.  Change is needed.  For better or 
worse, the federal courts have long held that the plaintiff is master of the 
complaint and can style the complaint in such a way as to defeat federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.24  Nonetheless, CAFA expressly targeted efforts 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.). 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (11) (2006).  
 22. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.  Of course, minimal diversity had already been 
adopted by Congress in previous legislation as the jurisdictional standard, but only in very 
limited circumstances.  See, e.g., Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMTJA), 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1441(e) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1335.  Using CAFA, however, 
Congress brought the minimal diversity concept, and the framers’ rationale behind it, to the 
forefront of our collective consciousness. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (11); see also infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 24. See, e.g., Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“[P]laintiffs as masters of the complaint may include (or omit) claims or parties in order to 
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by plaintiffs’ counsel to avoid the federal courts through creative pleading 
structure, and Congress intended the legislation, in part, to defeat such 
practices.25  Congressional efforts in this endeavor were not novel.  Rather, 
the rationale provided in support of CAFA was a direct extension of the 
same arguments offered in support of ratification of the diversity 
jurisdiction clause in Article III of the Constitution.26  Further, it was the 
natural evolution of the federal courts’ jurisprudence granting removal in 
situations where parties or claims were deemed to have been fraudulently or 
improperly joined to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction. 
Despite this clear directive from Congress, however, the federal courts 
continue to map their own contradictory course in removal matters.  For 
example, in Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., the Ninth Circuit was presented 
with the question of whether seven identical lawsuits, each naming 
approximately ninety-five plaintiffs (comprising 664 total), could be 
aggregated and removed to federal court under the mass action removal 
provision of CAFA.27  As the Ninth Circuit’s opinion makes clear, the only 
possible reason for this pleading structure was to avoid CAFA’s mass 
action removal provision.28  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the district 
court’s remand order.29  The Tanoh opinion is a study in contradictions: it 
purports to follow the plain language of the statute, but improperly relies on 
imagined legislative intent to support its ruling (despite actual legislative 
history that contradicts the court’s holding), and it renders the mass action 
removal provision both superfluous and inert, despite the court’s attempts 
to explain its operation.  Ultimately, it provides a roadmap to plaintiffs’ 
counsel on how to plead mass actions to avoid removal to federal district 
courts on diversity grounds.30  But irrespective of the many criticisms of the 
court’s holding, Tanoh is still relevant for purposes of this article because, 
like the various cases and doctrines already discussed, it has taken a 
                                                                                                                 
determine the forum . . . [so long as] the claims be real . . . the parties not be nominal.” 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 25. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005) (noting that “current law enables lawyers to ‘game’ 
the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state . . . actions in state courts”), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5, 2005 WL 627977. 
 26. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 3, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(advocating for a federal forum for all minimally diverse suits to secure “the inviolable 
maintenance of [the] equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union 
[are] entitled . . . against all evasion and subterfuge” (emphasis added)). 
 27. 561 F.3d 945, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 28. Id. at 951. 
 29. Id. at 953–56. 
 30. See infra notes 133–44 and accompanying text. 
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concept simple in design and application and stretched it to absurd 
proportions. 
* * * 
Viewing Tanoh as the tipping point, then, what clarity exists today, if 
any, vis-à-vis federal removal jurisdiction in diversity matters?31  Must 
adverse parties be completely diverse?  Yes.  Unless, of course, the 
nondiverse parties were fraudulently or improperly joined.  If fraudulently 
or improperly joined, what standard must the courts use to determine such 
improprieties?  Must the defendant show no possibility of recovery against 
the nondiverse defendant, as some district courts require?  Or, must the 
defendant go further and adduce evidence sufficient to prove sanctionable 
conduct by the plaintiff under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
fraudulent pleading practices,32 as is necessary in other courts?  Must the 
defendant demonstrate that the misjoinder of parties was egregious, or 
simply improper?  And under CAFA, must mass actions actually be 
comprised of one hundred or more plaintiffs, or can multiple identical suits 
be aggregated and removed as a single action?  As with complete diversity, 
the answer to this last question comes with a qualification.  Yes, the 
statutorily specified number of plaintiffs must be joined in a single action to 
effect removal unless, of course, the plaintiffs request or the court orders 
that the claims be tried together.33 
The framers proposed a straightforward rule: minimally diverse suits are 
federal in nature, and jurisdiction in the federal courts should be available 
to all parties in suits in which one party is a citizen of a state different from 
any one adverse party.  Rather than incorporate this clear statement into the 
legislation establishing the federal courts, however, Congress’s original 
directive on this point was less than definitive, leaving it open to 
interpretation by the courts.  Moreover, once saddled with the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of diversity jurisdiction (i.e., that complete diversity 
is required), Congress declined to amend the law to make clear its intent 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Although the term removal jurisdiction suffers from multiple and vague definitions, 
Professor Scott Dodson provides a succinct explication of the concept, describing removal 
jurisdiction (and specifically removal statutes) as those that “permit removal to the extent of 
original jurisdiction,” “expand jurisdiction,” and “narrow removal authorization (and 
consequently could be seen as narrowing jurisdiction).”  Scott Dodson, In Search of 
Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61, 64 (2008). 
 32. Specifically, FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 33. This assumes, with no guarantee, that no federal circuit court of appeals will in the 
future take up the mantle for defendants and, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Tanoh, 
grant removal under CAFA of multiple, aggregated cases each comprising fewer than one 
hundred plaintiffs. 
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either to adopt or to abrogate the complete diversity requirement.  This 
allowed the issue to fester, with Congress continuing to sit idly by as the 
federal courts took the arguably concrete concept of complete diversity and 
slowly undermined its dictates over time, producing the various joinder 
exceptions previously discussed.  Congress itself then exacerbated the 
problem further with recent legislation expressly adopting a minimal 
diversity standard in limited circumstances, thus bringing the issue to its 
present disjointed structure. 
As a result, today ours has become a system in which federal jurisdiction 
in diversity matters improperly hinges on the jurisdiction in which the 
underlying state action is brought.  Accordingly, it is a system in which 
similarly situated parties are treated differently.34  For example, despite 
their significant similarities, including the fact that all unquestionably 
involve controversies national in nature by virtue of their inclusion of 
citizens of multiple states (thus implicating the different laws of those 
states), removal will be upheld in some, but not all, of the six hypothetical 
situations presented above.  Moreover, of those hypothetical situations in 
which removal will be upheld, treatment will not necessarily be consistent 
across the federal district courts of the thirteen U.S. circuit courts of 
appeals.35  This is antithetical to the framers’ intent, which envisioned a 
federal forum for each of the suits described above.  Ultimately, it is an ad 
hoc system with which the courts themselves have grown increasingly 
displeased.  In recent years, numerous federal courts have openly 
campaigned for an overhaul of federal diversity jurisdiction in favor of a 
uniform, and easily applied test.36  It is time to answer their pleas. 
This article proposes, for the sake of simplicity in application, improved 
judicial efficiency, and to give effect to the framers’ original intent, that 
federal diversity jurisdiction be extended to all matters involving minimally 
diverse parties.37  Doing so would eliminate the unnecessarily complex 
                                                                                                                 
 34. For example, in actions removed to federal court under CAFA, the federal district 
court can exercise jurisdiction over all minimally diverse parties named to the dispute.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (2006).  By contrast, in cases in which removal is premised on 
misjoinder, the district court can exercise jurisdiction only over those plaintiffs completely 
diverse to defendants, and must remand the claims of the remaining nondiverse plaintiffs to 
state court.  See, e.g., Chaney v. Gate Pharm., No. Civ.A. 98-20478, 1203, 1999 WL 
554584, at *3–5 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999). 
 35. That is, whereas removal of the case in the third hypothetical scenario will be 
upheld by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for example, it will be 
rejected by the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, among others.   
 36. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 37. Although this article focuses on removal to highlight various ways diversity 
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patchwork of rules that currently govern diversity jurisdiction.  It would 
instead provide a uniform rule to be applied regardless of the number of 
parties to an action.  It would also eliminate the temptation—so irresistible 
to so many parties litigating under the current regime—to “game” the 
system to manufacture or defeat jurisdiction, at the federal courts’ expense. 
Part II of this article focuses on the origins of federal diversity 
jurisdiction, the complete diversity requirement, and its subsequent (and 
steady) erosion over time.  Part III addresses the potential impact of this 
article’s proposal on concepts of federalism, and asks whether antiquated 
notions of state sovereignty and encroachment on so-called states’ rights 
remain valid concerns today—to the extent they were ever considerations 
taken into account by the framers when first proposing federal diversity 
jurisdiction.  Part IV looks at the potential costs and burdens on federal 
courts that would result from a relaxation of the requirements of diversity 
jurisdiction.  Part IV then highlights the benefits such legislation would 
produce (e.g., by providing a single forum to handle large-scale litigation 
unavailable under the current regime), and concludes that moving to a 
minimal diversity standard would result in an efficient and streamlined 
system of tort litigation in the federal courts focused on the merits of the 
disputes instead of procedural posturing. 
II. The Complete Diversity Rule: Its Underpinnings and Subsequent and 
Steady Erosion over Time 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify that the complete 
diversity rule is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a legislatively 
imposed restriction limiting access to the federal courts in diversity matters, 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction principles are manipulated in practice, it proposes the adoption of a minimum 
diversity standard applicable across the board (i.e., both in cases removed to federal court, as 
well as those filed there in the first instance).  The reason for the use of this framing device 
hopefully will be obvious—the major problems with the application of diversity jurisdiction 
derive from efforts by the parties to avoid (plaintiffs) or gain access to (defendants) the 
federal courts, which efforts are seen virtually exclusively in the removal context.  Moving 
to a minimum diversity standard is unlikely to create more or less controversy in original 
filings than the current framework (because, under both scenarios, the plaintiff will have 
chosen to litigate in federal court), but it will produce significant benefits in the removal 
context by establishing an easily applied rule in contrast to the current regime.  In response 
to concerns that this proposed standard will increase the number of cases filed with and 
heard by the federal courts, this article does not propose granting to the federal courts the 
full authority provided under Article III.  Notably, this article proposes tempering the 
exposure of the federal courts to diversity cases by increasing the amount-in-controversy 
requirement and imposing a mandatory abstention provision for cases truly “local” in nature. 
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which Congress can correct on its own initiative.38  To repeat the quote that 
begins this article, the Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power of 
the United States . . . shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens 
of different States.”39  Literally speaking, this provision requires only 
minimal diversity between adverse parties for the controversy to fall under 
the authority of the federal judiciary.  Although unnecessary in light of its 
plain meaning,40 this interpretation has been reiterated in numerous 
Supreme Court opinions.41  
Moreover, the framers unquestionably intended that the diversity 
jurisdiction provision of Article III be broadly construed.42  In defending 
the proposed implementation of a federal judiciary, Hamilton advocated for 
uniformity in decisions regarding the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States,43 as well as “all those [matters] which involve the PEACE of 
the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse between the 
United States and foreign nations, or to that between the States 
themselves.”44  Thus, not only did the framers intend for the federal 
judiciary to be open to all minimally diverse actions, they viewed the 
availability of a federal forum as the only way to ensure consistent 
treatment in these matters. 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring two-thirds majority vote in each house of Congress 
(or constitutional convention called for by two thirds of the fifty states) proposing an 
amendment to the Constitution, and subsequent ratification by three fourths of the states). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
 40. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:1, at 137–41 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 2A SUTHERLAND]; see also 
infra text accompanying note 133. 
 41. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 67–68 & n.3 (1996); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 199 
(1990); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 & n.13 (1978); State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 & nn.6–7 (1967).   
 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 3, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he national 
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to 
another State or its citizens.” (emphasis added)). 
 43. Id. at 462 (“Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, 
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction 
and confusion can proceed.”). 
 44. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).  Notably, Hamilton did not qualify his language 
regarding interstate disputes.  Rather, his language was sufficiently broad to encompass all 
disputes involving citizens from more than one state.  See id. at 462 (providing that this 
“plain proposition” rests on the concept that “the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at 
the disposal of a PART”); see also supra notes 3, 26 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Strawbridge v. Curtiss,45 which 
originally established the complete diversity rule, admittedly (and 
importantly) focused exclusively on the words of a statutory provision, and 
not the language of the Constitution itself, in arriving at its conclusion.46  
Over time, the Court’s repeated reaffirmation of Strawbridge47 has 
perpetuated an unnecessary and unwarranted restriction on the plain 
meaning of Article III’s diversity jurisdiction clause.  Whatever the original 
intentions behind Congress’s decision to stray from the contemporaneous 
language of Article III in establishing and defining access to the federal 
courts,48 the complete diversity rule as applied today bars access to the 
federal courts for many suits that are national in nature, in contravention of 
the framers’ design. 
A. Article III and the Federal Judiciary’s Scope of Authority in Diversity 
Matters Following the First Judiciary Act 
Enacted in quick succession, and sharing many of the same authors, 
Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789—the latter establishing the lower 
federal courts49—both spoke to the question of federal diversity 
jurisdiction, but with surprisingly discrepant definitions (resulting in 
subsequent divergent interpretations).50  Whereas Article III unequivocally 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
 46. Id. at 267 (expressly limiting its holding to “[t]he words of the act of congress”). 
 47. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (“Since 
Strawbridge . . . we have read the statutory formulation ‘between . . . citizens of different 
States’ to require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.” (quoting 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996))). 
 48. Professor Larry Yackle summarizes the long-espoused opinions regarding the 
purpose behind the enactment of federal diversity jurisdiction as follows: 
The conventional explanation for diversity jurisdiction is that out-of-state 
litigants may not receive fair treatment in the courts of the state in which their 
adversaries reside, or that local state legislatures may enact statutes favorable to 
their own.  Historians also point out that an effective system of federal courts 
was needed in the late eighteenth century to undergird national economic 
development. 
LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 230 n.116 (1994). 
 49. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.  It is important to recall that the 
jurisdictional provisions of Article III were not self-executing, and required an act of 
Congress to establish the lower federal courts and correspondingly to determine their judicial 
authority within the constraints provided by the Constitution. 
 50. Following its ratification by New Hampshire on June 21, 1788, the Constitution 
went into effect.  U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, 
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying 
the Same.”); CRAIG R. SMITH, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
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provides for federal jurisdiction in all controversies “between . . . Citizens 
of different States,” the authors of the First Judiciary Act extended 
jurisdiction to the federal courts only in circumstances “where . . . the suit is 
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of 
another State.”51   
The Supreme Court quickly latched onto the variance between the two 
provisions, founding the complete diversity rule on the jurisdictional 
provision in the First Judiciary Act instead of Article III.52  In doing so, the 
Court firmly established that the Constitution requires only minimal 
diversity between adverse parties to confer federal jurisdiction, even if a 
more restrictive rule ultimately is imposed by Congress—as was the case 
with the First Judiciary Act.53   
                                                                                                                 
CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1787–1791, at 25 (1993) (“New Hampshire became 
the ninth state to ratify [the Constitution] on June 21st, 1788 . . . .”).  The First Judiciary Act 
was enacted slightly more than one year later.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.  
Both were conceived and drafted by many of the same individuals.  See, e.g., Debra Lyn 
Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 52, 52 (2007) (noting that “the First Judiciary Act was drafted by a Congress that 
included many of the original Framers”). 
 51. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.  Because of their shared lineage, some scholars have suggested 
that the jurisdictional provisions of the First Judiciary Act “have been ascribed a stature near 
that enjoyed by Article III itself.”  See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 50, at 52.  Despite this 
common history, however, the Supreme Court almost immediately made clear the limited 
scope of the jurisdictional statute, and the expansiveness of the analogous provision of the 
Constitution.  Although the complete diversity rule—based on the first jurisdictional 
statute—has existed for more than two hundred years, the Court has taken great pains to 
make clear that jurisdictional statutes (and in particular the complete diversity rule) are not 
co-equals with the Constitutional provisions on which they are founded.  See infra note 52. 
 52. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). 
 53. The Court’s jurisprudence has made clear over time that, as written, the concept of 
federal diversity jurisdiction as set out in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 connotes only so-
called minimal diversity—which requires only that any one party be of different citizenship 
from any one adverse party.  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 & 
nn.6–7 (1967).  The concept of complete diversity was founded on the language used by 
Congress in establishing the lower federal courts, not the language of the Constitution itself.  
Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267 (construing § 11, 1 Stat. at 78).  This distinction is 
crucial to understanding Article III’s reach.  For, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed since Tashire, the complete diversity gloss read onto 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, and not a constitutional requirement.  See generally 
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81 (2005); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 
(1996); Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. 
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).  Thus, Congress is not constitutionally barred from giving the 
framers’ intent full effect.  Tashire, 386 U.S. at 531 (“Article III poses no obstacle to the 
legislative extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse 
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Notably, the language of the First Judiciary Act repurposed Article III as 
a jurisdictional provision directed solely to the question of a dispute 
between an “insider” (or, resident of the forum) and an “outsider” (or, a 
person outside of the forum state).  This is a narrow reading of Article III, 
which does not speak to forum, but only to the residences of the adverse 
parties.54  In later iterations, including its present form, Congress removed 
the forum component from the jurisdictional statute and expanded the 
statute’s scope to acknowledge the type of multiple party litigation 
commonplace in today’s practice, thus more closely aligning the statute 
with the language of the Constitution.55 
This statutory evolution is relevant because, with each modification to 
the diversity jurisdiction statute, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
complete diversity rule—despite a wholesale change over time of the 
jurisdictional provision from its original phrasing.  Indeed, the current 
provision now repeats verbatim the language of Article III,56 which, as 
demonstrated above, expressly abrogates complete diversity in favor of 
minimal diversity. 
This disconnect in the interpretation of the current jurisdictional 
provision is reflected in statements both from the Justices of the Supreme 
Court and those in academia who mistakenly suggest that the basis for the 
complete diversity rule (i.e., the statutory language) has remained 
                                                                                                                 
parties are not co-citizens.”).  In fact, in limited contexts, Congress has already carved out 
certain exceptions to the complete diversity rule.  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 54. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 3, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (advocating 
for the extension of federal judicial authority to all suits “between the different States and 
their citizens”).  In addition to stressing the forum (“where . . . the suit is between a citizen 
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State”), Congress’s initial, 
awkward phrasing of the diversity jurisdiction clause unnecessarily limited disputes (from a 
literal perspective, at least) to those between a single plaintiff and single defendant.  § 11, 1 
Stat. at 78. 
 55. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy . . . is between . . . citizens of 
different States.” (emphasis added)).   
 56. Although Article III speaks of controversies between citizens of different states and 
§ 1332 references civil actions, review of the legislative history surrounding the Constitution 
(both pre- and post-ratification) suggests that the framers intended the word “controversy” in 
Article III to refer exclusively to suits between named parties (and not, as some have 
suggested (including Hamilton) that “controversies” include all those with an interest in the 
suit—even if not named, or capable of being bound by the court’s decision).  See Mark 
Moller, A New Look at the Original Meaning of the Diversity Clause, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1113, 1125, 1131–76 (2009). 
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unchanged over time.57  The courts further suggest that the rationale 
supporting the complete diversity rule (the “bias” argument as Professor 
Larry Yackle describes it58) likewise remains a relevant concern today and 
supports the perpetuation of the complete diversity rule.59 
Whereas the Supreme Court has answered the first concern regarding the 
evolution of the diversity jurisdiction statute60—at least to its own 
satisfaction61—the bias rationale suggests the demise of the concept.  The 
key aspect of the bias argument is that state courts (and legislatures) could 
potentially be prone to bias against out-of-state parties when entertaining 
suits involving their own residents.  This concept is reinforced by the First 
Judiciary Act, which places special emphasis on the forum: requiring that 
“the suit [be] between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) (“Since 
Strawbridge . . . we have read the statutory formulation ‘between . . . citizens of different 
States’ to require complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.” (quoting 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996))); see also Bassett, supra note 50, at 58 
(“[T]he phrase ‘citizens of different States’ within § 1332(a) historically has been read 
differently from the identical phrase in Article III, with § 1332(a) requiring complete 
diversity of citizenship rather than merely the minimal diversity required by Article III.” 
(emphasis added)).  Both Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous court in Lincoln 
Property Co., and Professor Bassett implicitly suggest that the language of the statute has 
remained unchanged over time—and in fact has always included the “citizens of different 
states” language of Article III, when history unquestionably demonstrates otherwise.   
 58. YACKLE, supra note 48, at 230 n.116. 
 59. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 
(2005) (“The Court . . . has adhered to the complete diversity rule in light of the purpose of 
the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important disputes where 
state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state litigants.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978) 
(finding Congress’s failure to explicitly abrogate the complete diversity requirement in 
subsequent reenactments of the diversity jurisdiction statute evidence of the legislature’s 
tacit approval of the Strawbridge rule). 
 61. Under the reenactment rule of statutory interpretation, a presumption exists that, 
when a statute that previously received judicial interpretation is reenacted, “the reenacting 
Congress is presumed to have adopted the Supreme Court’s interpretations of [the] 
statute . . . .”  2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 49:9, at 127, 130–31 (7th ed. 2008); see also infra text accompanying note 
133.  Implicit in the canon, however, is that the statute is reenacted without material change.  
In the case of the diversity jurisdiction statute, the provision changed from addressing the 
case of a single plaintiff versus a single defendant to acknowledging the possibility of 
multiple adverse parties, and in later versions omitted the forum requirement altogether.  The 
Kroger rationale, although accepted, is not as definitive as the Court makes it appear—the 
statute has not remained unchanged over time, and in its current alignment with Article III 
could be perceived as having undergone significant change since its inception.   
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citizen of another State.”62  By limiting its decision to the First Judiciary 
Act, the Court explicitly limited the reach of Strawbridge to cases 
adjudicated under the original diversity jurisdiction statute and therefore 
under the bias rationale. 
Although the Court has over time continually reaffirmed the Strawbridge 
holding, the foundation for that decision nonetheless remains tied to the 
bias concept outlined by Professor Yackle.  Contrast that with today’s mass 
tort litigation, in which suits often bear little or no connection to the chosen 
forum, save for the naming of a few (or even one) resident plaintiffs63 and 
no resident defendant.  The bias argument (and the corresponding complete 
diversity requirement) no longer applies.  Rather, today’s litigation often 
has very little, if any, connection to the state in which the suit is brought 
when it involves numerous individual plaintiffs and multiple defendants, 
the vast majority of whom reside outside the forum.64 
Today’s mass tort suit is the prototypical suit involving “citizens of 
different states,” and should not be governed by an outmoded concept 
(complete diversity) premised on an outdated rationale (bias in favor of in-
state parties).  Hamilton’s statement that “the national judiciary ought to 
preside in all cases” involving minimally diverse parties has never had 
more resonance.65  Nevertheless, the lower federal courts (and Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (emphasis added). 
 63. Of course, the plaintiff may or may not have a valid claim against defendant.  See 
infra Part II.B. 
 64. In fact, Congress has stated explicitly that traditional concerns regarding bias no 
longer play a role in diversity jurisdiction:   
For example, less than 6 years ago Congress enacted the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1996, which increased the amount in controversy 
requirement needed to remove a diversity case to Federal court from $50,000 to 
$75,000.  This statutory change was based on the Judicial Conference's 
determination that fear of local prejudice by state courts was no longer 
relevant and that it was important to keep the Federal judiciary's efforts focused 
on Federal issues.  In this same regard, the American Law Institute has found 
“there is no longer the kind of prejudice against citizens of other states that 
motivated the creation of diversity jurisdiction,” and the most recent Federal 
Courts Study Committee report on the subject concluded that local bias “is no 
longer a major threat to litigation fairness” particularly when compared to other 
types of prejudice that litigants may face, such as on account of religion, race or 
economic status. 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-370, at 128 (2002), 2002 WL 388106 (emphasis added) (quoting AM. 
LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
106 (1996); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 40 (1990)). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 3, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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itself) have already spoken on the issue, and have signaled a shift away 
from the complete diversity rule.  Unfortunately, the piecemeal results have 
only complicated the issue, and mandate further change. 
B. Gamesmanship in Pleading Practices and the Judicial Response 
Having established that the complete diversity rule is not required by the 
Constitution, and further that it is based on an outdated premise, it is also 
necessary to demonstrate that the rule is no longer effective to support this 
article’s proposition that the complete diversity rule merits wholesale 
revision.  For, regardless of its origins, the complete diversity rule is 
longstanding, and the lynchpin to the federal court system’s exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction over diversity issues.  It should not be 
eviscerated without careful consideration.66  As shown below, however, the 
continuous layering of exceptions on top of the rule has cracked its 
foundation.  Accordingly, the rule must be rebuilt from the ground up, and 
rebuilt to address the types of multiple party, multistate lawsuits that dot the 
landscape today. 
1. The Fraudulent Joinder Doctrine 
One hundred years after the Court issued its rule in Strawbridge, it 
created an exception to that rule known today as the fraudulent joinder 
doctrine.67  Under this rule, a defendant may seek removal of an action to 
federal court despite the presence of a nondiverse defendant where the 
nondiverse defendant has been fraudulently joined.  On its face, the 
fraudulent joinder doctrine provides for a relatively simple test: defendants 
will be held to have been fraudulently joined if “there is no reasonable basis 
for predicting that plaintiffs might establish liability . . . against the in-state 
defendants” on the claims pled in state court.68   
                                                                                                                 
 66. Indeed, one legitimate response to the major premise of this article is that, rather 
than revise or abrogate the rule, it should simply be more rigorously and uniformly enforced.  
That is, the rule itself is not the problem; rather, the problem lies in the courts’ unwillingness 
to enforce it.  In response to those criticisms, the myriad exceptions to the doctrine have now 
become so intertwined with the rule that to revert back to a truly complete diversity system 
would be to give effect to a fallacy.  The complete diversity rule is unworkable precisely 
because its name presupposes a system that does not exist.  As the cases and statutes in this 
section demonstrate, federal diversity jurisdiction has no clear framework—despite its 
namesake complete diversity rule—thus mandating that such a framework be established 
and applied.  
 67. Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907). 
 68. Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2000).  A defendant may 
also argue fraudulent joinder on the ground that the plaintiff committed “actual fraud in the 
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Although the doctrine has existed for a significant period of time, 
scholars have noted a recent upswing in its assertion,69 corresponding with 
the increase in multiple party, mass tort suits filed across the country.70  
This expansion has proved problematic to the application of the rule.  As 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[t]here has . . . been 
some uncertainty over the proper means for predicting whether a plaintiff 
has a reasonable basis of recovery under state law.”71   
For example, the Fifth Circuit contextualizes the test as follows: “[a] 
‘mere theoretical possibility of recovery under local law’ will not preclude 
a finding of improper joinder.”72  Instead, there must be a “reasonable 
basis” for recovery from the non-diverse defendant.73  That is, the “mere 
assertion of metaphysical doubt as to the material facts i[s] insufficient” to 
establish a reasonable basis for predicting recovery under state law.74  
Conversely, other federal circuit courts of appeals require the defendant to 
prove that there is “no possibility” of recovery against a nondiverse 
defendant,75 and that “[a] claim need not ultimately succeed to defeat 
                                                                                                                 
pleading of jurisdictional facts.”  See, e.g., Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573 
(5th Cir. 2004).  Because this latter ground for removal is less controversial than its “no 
reasonable basis” counterpart, is asserted far less often, and is more easily proved (e.g., the 
certificate of incorporation demonstrates that the relevant defendant in fact is not a resident 
of the forum state), it does not provoke the same exasperation as the no reasonable basis test, 
and is therefore omitted from discussion here. 
 69. See, e.g., 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3641.1 (3d ed. 2009) (noting “a virtual epidemic of the invocation of these procedures in 
the federal courts in the recent past . . .”). 
 70. Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung, 26 REV. LITIG. 883, 906 (2007) (noting 
that “federal product liability filings . . . almost quadrupled over the nine-year period” from 
1997 to 2005 and that “the substantial increase in product liability filings . . . suggest[s] that 
the pool of cases from which mass toxic tort litigation arises is likely growing rather than 
shrinking”); see also id. at 910 (noting that the number of federal mass tort class actions 
doubled from 1997 to 2001). 
 71. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. 
 72. Id. at 573 n.9 (quoting Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 236 F.3d 282, 286 n.4 (5th Cir. 
2000)). 
 73. Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699–701 (5th Cir. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
 74. Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Jernigan v. 
Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75. See, e.g., Baltimore County v. Cigna Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 920 (4th Cir. 
2007) (quoting Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 464 (4th Cir. 1999)); Henderson v. Wash. 
Nat’l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2006) (requiring proof of “no possibility” 
of recovery). 
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removal; only a possibility of a right to relief need be asserted.”76  To 
further compound the confusion, even within a circuit a test may be 
described as the “no possibility” test, but in practice require proof only that 
there is no reasonable basis for recovery.77 
In addition to the standard to be applied in demonstrating fraudulent 
joinder, the federal courts also disagree on whether to allow extrinsic 
evidence to demonstrate whether a plaintiff has a reasonable basis for 
recovery against a nondiverse defendant.  Some courts limit their analysis 
to the facts as pled in the complaint, what the Smallwood court describes as 
a “Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis.”78  Other courts, however, will pierce the 
pleadings to determine the merits of plaintiff’s case.79  In these latter cases, 
extrinsic evidence typically is allowed only to demonstrate that the plaintiff 
cannot prove a claim against the nondiverse defendant and not that the 
nondiverse defendant has a valid defense to that claim.80 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Baltimore County, 238 F. App’x at 920 (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 
F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. E.g., In re 1994 Exxon Chem. Fire, 558 F.3d 378, 385 (5th Cir. 2009) (defining the 
“no possibility” test as requiring defendant to demonstrate only that there was “no 
reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiffs might be able to recover” 
against the nondiverse defendants (emphasis added)).  For a more detailed analysis of the 
various standards employed by the federal circuit courts of appeals in the fraudulent joinder 
context, see E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal 
Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 216–20 (2005). 
 78. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004); see also First Baptist 
Church of Tex. City v. Knowles, No. G-10-111, 2010 WL 2991224, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 
2010) (applying a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis and holding that, in assessing the pleadings, “[t]he 
Court does ‘not determine whether the plaintiff will actually or even probably prevail on the 
merits of [its state law] claim, but look[s] only for a possibility that the plaintiff might do so’” 
(quoting Guillory v. PPG Indus. Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 2005))). 
 79. See, e.g., Badon, 224 F.3d at 389 (“[D]iversity removal may be based on evidence 
outside the pleadings to establish that the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery on the claim 
or claims asserted against the named resident defendant and that hence such defendant is 
fraudulently joined and his citizenship must be disregarded for jurisdictional purpose.”); 
Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Where fraudulent 
joinder is an issue . . . ‘[t]he defendant seeking removal to the federal court is entitled to 
present the facts showing the joinder to be fraudulent.’” (quoting McCabe v. Gen. Foods 
Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987))); Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 
F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1995) (endorsing “a summary judgment-like procedure” to dispose 
of fraudulent joinder claims) (citation omitted); Cabalceta v. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 
1553, 1561 (11th Cir. 1989) (“In addressing the issue of fraudulent joinder, the district court 
should resolve all questions of fact and controlling law in favor of the plaintiff and can 
consider any submitted affidavits and/or deposition transcripts.” (construing Coker v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440 (11th Cir. 1983))). 
 80. See, e.g., Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1318 (noting that cases allowing extrinsic evidence 
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From a practical perspective, the fraudulent joinder analysis is further 
complicated by the fact that little to no discovery has been exchanged by 
the parties at the time of removal—if noticed contemporaneously with the 
pleadings—from which the defendant can determine the validity of the 
plaintiff’s claims directed to the nondiverse defendant.  Despite the 
procedural rule allowing for removal “thirty days after receipt . . . of an 
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be 
ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable,”81 some 
courts allow for immediate removal of the matter if the removing defendant 
can show the plaintiff insufficiently investigated the claim against the 
nondiverse defendant.82  This creates an interesting burden-shift in the 
removal context whereby the plaintiff is required to prove the validity of 
her claims against the nondiverse defendant to support remand.83 
Of course, the legal standard to be applied, the corresponding burden of 
proof, and the admissibility of evidence to justify (or defeat) removal can 
all fluctuate from one jurisdiction to the next when evaluating fraudulent 
joinder.  This can result in parties routinely involved in litigation arguing 
competing, or even contradictory, theories of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in cases with nearly identical procedural postures. 
2. Misjoinder of Claims 
Similar to the concept of fraudulent joinder, but more recently adopted 
and with far more attendant controversy, certain federal courts have also 
upheld removal in matters lacking complete diversity on the ground that the 
claims of parties completely diverse to defendants were improperly joined 
with the claims of those who were not diverse to the defendants.   
                                                                                                                 
“looked to whether the plaintiff truly had a cause of action against the alleged sham 
defendants,” and not “whether those defendants could propound defenses to an otherwise 
valid cause of action”).  The court in Ritchey explained this distinction as being the 
difference between arguing the validity of joinder (where extrinsic evidence would be 
allowed) and arguing the merits of the case (where extrinsic evidence would be disallowed 
and, by extension, removal denied).  Id. at 1318–19. 
 81. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006). 
 82. See, e.g., Sellers v. Foremost Ins. Co., 924 F. Supp. 1116, 1118–19 (M.D. Ala. 
1996) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and holding that, “to block a fraudulent-
joinder charge,” plaintiff “must be able to provide some showing that her claim against the 
resident defendant has evidentiary support or is likely to have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”). 
 83. Cf. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574 (“The party seeking removal bears a heavy burden 
of proving that the joinder of the in-state party was improper.” (emphasis added)). 
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The misjoinder concept was first adopted by the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit in 1996 in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp.84  There, 
the Eleventh Circuit addressed a situation in which plaintiffs joined together 
in a single action two sets of unrelated claims against two separate groups 
of defendants—some diverse to plaintiffs and some nondiverse.85  The 
district court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that the two sets of 
claims were improperly joined because, although certain facts were 
common to both claims, the claims did not assert “joint, several, or 
alternative liability.”86  The Tapscott holding was later applied to cases in 
which numerous unrelated plaintiffs attempted to join unrelated personal 
injury claims against a single defendant in a single action.87  To date, 
however, other federal circuit courts of appeals have been hesitant to rule 
on the validity of the misjoinder concept.88  The rule likewise has received 
varying treatment in the federal district courts.89 
                                                                                                                 
 84. 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office 
Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).   
 85. Id. at 1355. 
 86. Id. at 1359–60 (relying on Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
finding joinder of claims to be improper).   
 87. See, e.g., Chaney v. Gate Pharm., No. Civ.A. 98-20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at 
*3–4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999) (upholding the propriety of defendant’s removal where 
“[p]laintiffs attempt[ed] to join persons from seven different states into one civil action who 
have absolutely no connection to each other except that they each ingested [the drugs at 
issue]” and fail to “allege that they took the same drug or combination of drugs [or]. . . that 
they received the drugs from the same source or any other similar connection”); see also In 
re Benjamin Moore & Co., 309 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 2002) (providing in dicta that 
“misjoinder of plaintiffs should not be allowed to defeat diversity jurisdiction”); Asher v. 
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. Civ.A. 04CV522KKC, 2005 WL 1593941, at *7 (E.D. Ky. 
June 30, 2005) (adopting fraudulent misjoinder doctrine). 
 88. See, e.g., Lafalier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 391 F. App’x 732, 739 (10th Cir. 
2010) (“There may be many good reasons to adopt procedural misjoinder, as the Insurers 
argue.  But we need not decide that issue today, because the record before us does not show 
that adopting the doctrine would change the result in this case.”); Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 
610 F.3d 390, 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (declining to hear the argument for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 622 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We 
make no judgment on the propriety of the doctrine in this case, and decline to either adopt or 
reject it at this time.”); In re Benjamin Moore, 309 F.3d at 298 (implicitly upholding the rule 
in denying mandamus petition to review district court’s exercise of diversity jurisdiction). 
 89. See, e.g., Reuter v. Medtronics, Inc., No. 10-3019 (WJM), 2010 WL 4628439, at *4 
n.1 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2010) (noting the adoption of the misjoinder rule by federal district 
courts in Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia, and its rejection by federal 
district courts in California, Illinois, Ohio, and Rhode Island). 
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The reasons for the federal judiciary’s hesitance to adopt Tapscott are 
many.  But in particular, the courts rejecting the concept have pointed to 
two critical issues: (1) whether to apply state or federal rules of procedure 
in determining misjoinder; and (2) plaintiffs’ level of culpability in their 
joinder of potentially unrelated claims.90  These concerns were recently 
summarized by the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Illinois in Baker v. Johnson & Johnson,91 in which the court issued a 
scathing rebuke of the misjoinder doctrine: 
Finally, the Court surveyed case law attempting to apply the 
fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and observed that courts have 
struggled with virtually every aspect of the meaning and scope of 
the doctrine, including: whether a mere misjoinder of parties or 
claims can constitute fraudulent misjoinder or if an egregious 
misjoinder is required; what constitutes an egregious misjoinder 
of parties or claims; and whether fraudulent misjoinder is to be 
tested using federal procedural rules governing joinder or state 
procedural rules governing joinder.92 
From one perspective, the Tapscott rule attempts to combat a very real 
pleading practice,93 the explicit design of which is to avoid federal diversity 
jurisdiction.94  But the Baker court’s concerns regarding the application of 
the rule are legitimate, and further demonstrate the fracture of removal 
jurisdiction on diversity grounds into a concept with many competing rules 
and no clear consensus. 
First, the question of which procedural rules to apply in determining 
misjoinder is not easily answered.  Beginning with Tapscott, several courts 
that have adopted the doctrine have advocated for an application of the 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Baker v. Johnson & Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d 677 (S.D. Ill. 2010). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 686 (emphasis added). 
 93. See, e.g., Notice of Removal ¶ 1, Ward v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, No. 2:10-cv-
01881-SLB (N.D. Ala. July 16, 2010), 2010 WL 3878787 (summarizing the case as having 
been “commenced by 99 plaintiffs from 30 different states—only some of whom are 
Alabama citizens . . . for injuries allegedly arising from the use of” defendants’ prescription 
medication). 
 94. See, e.g., Chaney v. Gate Pharm., No. Civ.A. 98-20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999) (finding a pleading structure purporting to join claims of 
plaintiffs of “vast geographic diversity and . . . [no] reasonable connection to each other” as 
“devoid of any redeeming feature as respects the underlying purposes of the joinder rules” 
and intended solely to defeat defendants’ right of removal). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.95  This decision is not without logic, and 
can be said to have a legitimate basis in the law.96  The rationale offered by 
these courts in support of the application of federal rules of procedure 
invokes an Erie-type choice, even if the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie is 
not referred to by name.97 
Yet the rationale for the application of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure ultimately begs the question.  That is, arguably implicit in the 
application of the federal rules is the assumption that the plaintiffs have 
attempted to evade the federal courts through fraudulent pleading practices 
and therefore should be bound by federal joinder standards.  One could thus 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See, e.g., Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 1996), 
abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“The joinder of defendants in this action has been accomplished solely through [Rule] 
20.”); In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 651 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[J]oinder 
among plaintiffs is only proper if they allege a claim ‘arising out of the same transaction, 
occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact 
common to all these persons will arise in the action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a))).  
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permissive joinder of parties in the same action 
is allowed only where plaintiffs “assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the 
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences [and] any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will 
arise in the action.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1).   
 96. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing principle that 
federal rules of procedure apply in diversity cases). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Silica, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 651 n.141 (noting that, in procedural 
matters, “‘we are controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .  [and] look to the 
federal statutes as construed by . . . [sic] federal decisions to determine whether the case is 
removable in whole or in part, all questions of joinder, non-joinder, and misjoinder being for 
the federal court’” (quoting Edwards v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 183 F.2d 165, 168 
(5th Cir. 1950))).  Although the court in In re Silica did not perform a full-blown Erie 
analysis, the court further acknowledged that the question of joinder would be the same 
under the applicable state rules of procedure, as they did not differ materially from the 
federal rules.  Id. at 654.  Under the Erie line of cases, absent a conflict between state and 
federal rules, and no inducement on the part of the plaintiff to seek the federal forum, the 
application of the federal procedural rule is likely the correct holding.  See, e.g., Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752–53 (1980).  Further, even were the rules to conflict, 
Erie and its progeny likely would still favor application of the federal rule.  See, e.g., Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (noting 
validity—and applicability—of federal rule that “regulates procedure . . . regardless of its 
incidental effect upon state-created rights”).  As other courts have acknowledged, however, 
irrespective of a conflict between the rules, applying the federal rules to a nondiverse matter 
removed from state court premised on a misjoinder argument assumes jurisdiction over the 
matter before the validity of federal diversity jurisdiction is actually determined.  See infra 
note 98 and accompanying text. 
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argue that courts adopting the misjoinder doctrine and applying federal 
rules of procedure have already placed a finger firmly on the scale in favor 
of federal jurisdiction.98  For this reason, many courts have broken with 
Tapscott on this point, choosing instead to apply state rules of civil 
procedure in determining propriety of joinder.99  Nonetheless, there remains 
a split of authority in the federal courts, with some continuing to apply 
federal rules, and others relying on their state counterparts. 
Second, and equally confounding to critics of the misjoinder doctrine, is 
the emphasis placed on the level of culpability of the plaintiffs.  In 
Tapscott, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that removal could not be 
supported in all cases of misjoinder, but only in those instances where 
misjoinder was “egregious.”100  This type of “smell test” used by the courts 
to determine propriety of joinder has not received universal support from all 
courts that have adopted the misjoinder doctrine.  Indeed, not even all 
federal courts that have followed Tapscott have deemed egregious pleading 
practices necessary to reach a conclusion of misjoinder.101  Although policy 
reasons likely support the Tapscott heightened standard,102 the “egregious” 
                                                                                                                 
 98. In applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to determine propriety of joinder, 
the court essentially puts the cart before the horse—exercising jurisdiction over a matter 
filed in state court on the ground of fraudulent pleading practices, only to then determine that 
those pleading practices were, in fact, fraudulent.  See, e.g., Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 
251 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1321 n.6 (S.D. Miss. 2003) (“It makes little sense to say that the 
resident doctor’s joinder became fraudulent only after removal and only under the federal 
rule.”). 
 99. Asher v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. Civ.A. 04CV522KKC, 2005 WL 1593941, 
at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 30, 2005) (citing cases); see also Osborn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 341 F. 
Supp. 2d 1123, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (“[Applying state rules of procedure] seems the better 
choice since the question is whether the parties were misjoined in state court.”). 
 100. Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360 (“We do not hold that mere misjoinder is fraudulent 
joinder, but we do agree with the district court that Appellants’ attempt to join these parties 
is so egregious as to constitute fraudulent joinder.”). 
 101. Compare Burns v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 401, 403 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) 
(“In this district, the ‘egregious’ nature of the misjoinder is not relevant to the analysis.”), 
and In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“While 
aware that several courts have applied Tapscott’s egregiousness standard when considering 
misjoinder of plaintiffs in the context of remand petitions, this Court respectfully takes 
another path.”), with Asher, 2005 WL 1593941, at *7 (“[S]omething more than ‘mere 
misjoinder’ is required before this Court may take the extraordinary step of exercising 
jurisdiction over an action where jurisdiction is lacking on the face of the complaint.”). 
 102. For example, the rule likely was not intended to allow for removal of every case in 
which an unsophisticated plaintiff’s counsel believed, however erroneously, that his 
complaint under the law legitimately joined the claims of multiple parties against defendant.  
Rather, the rule was intended to target the fraudulent gamesmanship of certain counsel to 
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concept is amorphous, and not easily or consistently applied.  No matter the 
application, however, the larger issue is the variation in treatment of 
similarly situated parties.  And with each successive court’s modified 
interpretation of the rule, the potential for a new plaintiff- or defendant-
friendly jurisdiction arises. 
Finally, certain courts have questioned whether federal courts have the 
ability to entertain removals premised on misjoinder at all.  To these courts, 
the question of whether joinder is legitimate not only is an issue of state 
procedure, but a question to be decided exclusively by the state court in 
which the suit is filed.103  As such, a defendant’s recourse in these 
jurisdictions, rather than to attempt removal, is to move the state court to 
sever the unrelated claims.104   
                                                                                                                 
avoid federal diversity jurisdiction. 
 103. See, e.g., Rutherford v. Merck & Co., 428 F. Supp. 2d 842, 851 (S.D. Ill. 2006) 
(finding that “the federal courts traditionally have held that matters of state civil procedure, 
including, presumably, joinder of parties and claims, have no bearing on the existence or 
nonexistence of federal subject matter jurisdiction in a given case”).  Accordingly,  
the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine is contrary to settled judicial understanding 
of the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction on removal. . . .  [T]he 
jurisprudence of both the United States Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals regarding fraudulent joinder to defeat diversity jurisdiction 
has never suggested that a misjoinder of legally viable and non-fraudulent 
claims under state law is a species of fraudulent joinder, and in fact the 
longstanding principle in the federal courts has been that questions of joinder, 
particularly under state rules of civil procedure, do not implicate federal subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Baker v. Johnson & Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d 677, 686 (S.D. Ill. 2010). 
 104. Some scholars suggest that the complexities of the misjoinder doctrine militate in 
favor of seeking severance at the state court level, and then later attempting removal in those 
severed cases in which complete diversity then exists: 
In many situations, confusion could be reduced if removing parties would 
challenge fraudulent joinders and misjoinders in state court, before defendants 
file a removal notice. The 30-day time limit for removal (but not the overall 
one-year limit for diversity cases) would not begin to run until any misjoined, 
or fraudulently joined, non-diverse party was dropped from the action. Thus, a 
requirement that fraudulent joinder or misjoinder be addressed in the state court 
would not impair the ability of an individual to remove an action following the 
elimination of the improperly joined party—unless the one-year limit on 
removal were implicated. 
14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723 (4th ed. 
2009).  Although arguably a valid suggestion (from an efficiency standpoint), it omits the 
fact that removal might not be allowed following severance based on a separate, 
longstanding principle: “that only a voluntary act by the plaintiff [can] convert a non-
removable case into a removable one.”  Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 
761 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).  Should defendants move to sever misjoined 
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Like its fraudulent joinder cousin, the misjoinder doctrine, because of its 
limited acceptance and varied application, creates the potential for one set 
of facts to be treated in multiple different ways depending upon the 
jurisdiction in which the suit is filed. 
C. Congress’s (Limited) Reversion to Minimal Diversity 
Congress recently enacted two pieces of legislation that sought, in 
limited contexts, to vest the federal judiciary with the full authority granted 
by the diversity jurisdiction provision of Article III (and by extension the 
full authority envisioned by the framers of the Constitution).105  In both 
instances, Congress focused squarely on the need to provide a federal forum 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiffs in the state court in a jurisdiction that has adopted the misjoinder rule (and 
succeed), the plaintiffs would then have a legitimate argument, in support of remand, that the 
case has now become removable solely because of defendant’s action, precluding the federal 
district court from exercising diversity jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 
249, 252 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[I]f the [nondiverse] defendant was dismissed from the case by 
the voluntary act of the plaintiff, the case [becomes] removable, but if the dismissal was the 
result of either the defendant’s or the court’s action against the wish of the plaintiff, the case 
[can] not be removed.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).  Moreover, this argument 
naïvely presumes that state courts will readily sever misjoined parties—a presumption 
contradicted by past precedent.  For example, in McCallum v. General Electric Co., the 
Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois, denied 
defendant’s motion to sever and dismiss the claims of twenty-four out-of-state plaintiffs 
(hailing from twelve different states) purportedly joined to the claims of two Illinois 
residents.  No. 08-L-394 (Ill. 20th Jud. Cir. Ct. St. Clair Cty. Oct. 28, 2009) (order denying 
motion to sever and dismiss) (on file with author); see also Brief of Appellants-Defendants 
at 4–8, McCallum v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 5-09-0633 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 11, 2010) (noting 
number and citizenship of parties) (on file with author). The trial court upheld the propriety 
of joinder under the Illinois rules of procedure, which require that the claims arise out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-404 (West 2003), 
despite the fact that the twenty-four nonresident plaintiffs received medical treatment in their 
respective states of residence, from different doctors, for varying medical conditions, see 
Brief of Appellants-Defendants at 10–16, McCallum, No. 5-09-0633. 
 105. This article suggests neither that the two pieces of legislation discussed herein are 
the only two in which Congress has adopted a minimal diversity standard nor that 
Congress’s adoption of minimal diversity is a recent phenomenon.  See, e.g., State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (interpreting the federal interpleader 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, which allows for federal subject matter jurisdiction in suits 
involving “[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship,” to require only minimal 
diversity among adverse parties).  Rather, the two statutes were selected for discussion 
because they reflect a recent effort by Congress to implement a minimal diversity standard in 
tort litigation on a broad scale, and Congress’s reliance on the framers’ original 
understanding of the scope and intent of Article III to support the statutes’ enactment.  
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for suits involving parties from multiple states, notwithstanding a lack of 
complete diversity among those parties.   
As the following will demonstrate, however, those pieces of legislation, 
with respect to artificial limitations placed on the federal courts’ exercise of 
jurisdiction, are as maddeningly inconsistent in their treatment of similarly 
situated parties as the judge-made exceptions to complete diversity already 
discussed.  Further, the statutes were, in part, the product of extensive 
lobbying from the defense bar, and thus are extremely limited in scope and 
purpose.  They ultimately did nothing to ameliorate the lack of uniformity 
in providing a federal forum to actions national in nature.  To the contrary, 
they only served to further complicate the problem. 
1. Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act 
In 2002, Congress passed the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction 
Act (MMTJA), a piece of legislation designed to consolidate and provide a 
federal forum to all cases arising from a single, massive accident or 
disaster.106  Under the MMTJA, original jurisdiction is conferred upon the 
federal courts in any civil case involving minimal diversity between adverse 
parties and involving a single accident at a discrete location where at least 
seventy-five persons died and either (a) the accident occurred in a state or 
other location different from that of defendant’s residence, (b) “any two 
defendants reside in different States,” or (c) “substantial parts of the 
accident took place in different States.”107   
Further, and notable in its alignment with the framers’ intent, Congress 
took the additional step of expanding Title 28 of the U.S. Code to allow for 
removal not only of an action that “could have been brought” under the 
MMTJA, but of any action arising from the same accident forming the basis 
of an action already proceeding in federal court and to which the defendant 
seeking removal is a party, “even if the action to be removed could not have 
been brought in a district court as an original matter.”108 
Prior to passage of the MMTJA, Congress stressed the importance of a 
single, federal forum to provide consistency in decisions, and economy of 
resources, for the type of suit that spans parties and events covering 
multiple different states: 
                                                                                                                 
 106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369 (a), 1441(e)(1) (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 107-685, at 199 
(2002) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120, 1151, 2002 WL 31163881. 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a). 
 108. Id. § 1441(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
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It is common after a serious accident to have many lawsuits filed 
in several states, in both state and federal courts, with many 
different sets of plaintiffs’ lawyers and several different 
defendants. . . .  The waste of judicial resources—and the costs 
to both plaintiffs and defendants—of litigating the same liability 
question several times over in separate lawsuits can be 
extreme.109 
Moreover, the report went on to suggest that “[t]he revisions should reduce 
litigation costs as well as the likelihood of forum-shopping . . . .”110  
Nonetheless, despite the rhetoric regarding the benefit to the parties and 
economies of scale provided by consolidation of matters in federal court, 
the MMTJA is infrequently used as a basis for federal jurisdiction (in no 
small part due to its seventy-five-death requirement), and only then 
primarily in air disaster litigation.111 
2. CAFA, Tanoh, and the Question of Aggregation 
Three years later, in 2005, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness 
Act (CAFA), expanding the scope of judicial authority in the minimum 
diversity context to the class- and mass-action settings.112  CAFA’s 
construct, as well as its logic, is surprisingly simple.  Under CAFA, the 
federal courts shall have original jurisdiction over any class action113 in 
which the adverse parties are minimally diverse and the total amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000.114  Further, defendants may remove to 
federal court any “mass action” joining the claims of one hundred or more 
                                                                                                                 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 107-685, at 200, reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120, 1152, 2002 
WL 31163881. 
 110. Id. 
 111. This should not be surprising since the driving force behind the legislation, at least 
in prominent part, came from the airline industry lobby.  See id. (“The need for enactment of 
[the MMTJA] was articulated by an attorney who testified on behalf of a major airline 
manufacturer at the June 16, 1999, hearing on H.R. 2112.”).  Moreover, however sadly, 
passage finally occurred—despite years of haggling in Congress—mere months after the 
tragedies of (and resulting litigation from) September 11, 2001.  See 21st Century 
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 
Stat. 1758, 1826–29 (2002). 
 112. See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 28 U.S.C.). 
 113. As certified under FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). 
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plaintiffs in a single suit, so long as the CAFA amount in controversy is 
met.115 
The directive behind the legislation was clear: “[t]he purposes of this Act 
are to . . . restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution 
by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance under diversity jurisdiction,”116 and, more specifically, to 
combat efforts to defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction through creative 
pleading practices.117  To meet these objectives, CAFA’s scope in 
application of minimum diversity truly is expansive—requiring only that 
there be minimal diversity between any class member (whether named or 
unnamed) and any defendant.118  This broad application of minimum 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. § 1332(d)(11).  Although the term “mass action” is used in the removal context 
instead of the term “class action,” the terminology reflects only that a class action is not 
required at the state level to allow for removal to federal court, because requiring class 
certification under various state procedural rules could be used by plaintiffs to preclude 
removal (e.g., by filing the equivalent of a class action, but posturing it as the joinder of 
numerous related claims).  As CAFA’s legislative history suggests, the statute was designed 
specifically to address these types of semantic variations in pleading structure that 
potentially could defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 
(2005) (“[T]he overall intent of [CAFA] is to strongly favor the exercise of federal diversity 
jurisdiction over class actions with interstate ramifications[;] . . . the definition of ‘class 
action’ is to be interpreted liberally.  Its application should not be confined solely to lawsuits 
that are labeled ‘class actions’ by the named plaintiff or the state rulemaking authority.”), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34, 2005 WL 627977; see also id. at 46 (“Mass action 
cases function very much like class actions and are subject to many of the same abuses.”), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 43. 
 116. CAFA § 2(b), 119 Stat. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 117. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (“[C]urrent law enables lawyers to ‘game’ the 
procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts . . . .”), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5, 2005 WL 627977. 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1), (2).  Some scholars have skeptically noted the validity of a 
jurisdictional provision based on the citizenship of unnamed parties, which some have 
argued pushes CAFA to the brink of what is allowed under the Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Moller, supra note 56, at 1129–30.  Although Professor Moller concludes otherwise 
regarding the validity of CAFA, as he suggests, the case or controversy requirement of 
Article III refers to “suits” as that term has traditionally been interpreted, meaning that it 
includes only those parties “before the court”—or those parties named in the suit.  Id.  at 
1174.  Cf. id. at 1180 (demonstrating that “Article III allows federal courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over a suit on a minimum diversity theory, even if the named plaintiff and 
defendant are nondiverse,” so long as the unnamed party has “(1) an 
identifiable . . . relationship with one of the named parties . . . and (2) she lives outside the 
state of an adverse named party’s residence at the time the suit is filed”). 
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diversity dovetails neatly with Hamilton’s arguments in favor of an 
expansive interpretation of Article III.119 
Yet, in its application, CAFA has missed the mark in bringing all suits of 
national importance before the federal courts.  Rather, although it has 
proved to be another obstacle for plaintiffs’ attorneys attempting to defeat 
removal to federal court, by no means has it proved to be insurmountable.  
In CAFA, Congress, with the help of the federal judiciary, unwittingly 
created a roadmap to the plaintiffs’ bar for avoiding federal subject matter 
jurisdiction entirely in mass tort litigation. 
As it is constructed, CAFA places an odd and unnecessary restriction on 
removal jurisdiction, contradicting its stated intent to bring mass, national 
litigation before a federal forum.  Specifically, CAFA’s mass action 
removal provision provides that, after removal, the district court may 
exercise jurisdiction only over those plaintiffs whose claims exceed the 
individual amount in controversy requirement of § 1332(a), or $75,000.120  
This restriction appears even more arbitrary and capricious when contrasted 
with the statute’s provision that removal may be effected in any mass action 
in which the claims of one hundred or more “persons” are to be tried 
jointly.121  Some have argued that this choice of words allows nonparties to 
be counted toward the one hundred person requirement.122 
The internal inconsistency presents an interesting paradox contrary to the 
statute’s stated purpose: CAFA seemingly provides vast authority to 
remove, at least if one liberally construes the one hundred person 
requirement to allow for removal, but once removed, the federal court is 
both (1) required to excise a potentially large number of plaintiffs for 
failing to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement123 and (2) precluded 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B). 
 121. Id. 
 122. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 
2008) (holding that unnamed policy holders were “real parties in interest” such that they 
counted toward the one hundred “person” requirement of CAFA’s mass action removal 
provision).  Indeed, such a construction would not seem out of place when viewed in tandem 
with CAFA’s provision on class actions, allowing for original federal jurisdiction based on 
minimal diversity between defendant and any unnamed plaintiff. 
 123. This restriction regarding the amount in controversy seems especially incongruous 
given CAFA’s history.  The traditional rationale for the amount-in-controversy requirement 
is typically summarized as necessary “[t]o ensure that diversity jurisdiction does not flood 
the federal courts with minor disputes.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 
U.S. 546, 552 (2005).  Based on Congress’s statements in support of CAFA, by the fact of 
its consolidation, a mass action necessarily is no longer a “minor dispute.”  Further, excising 
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from issuing binding judgments regarding the potential claims of persons—
not “parties”—with potential claims against the defendant.  Thus, the 
litigation as a whole does not benefit either from consolidation or a federal 
forum.124  Rather, a single, joined action is severed into multiple parts and 
scattered among federal and state courts.125  Moreover, this internal 
inconsistency seems quaint by comparison when contrasted with recent 
judicial interpretations of CAFA that have eviscerated the statute’s aim to 
                                                                                                                 
individual claims from a mass action makes little sense in light of CAFA’s requirement that 
those claims be “tried together” in order to justify federal subject matter jurisdiction.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B). 
 124. CAFA’s artificial limitation based on the amount-in-controversy requirement 
creates a further inconsistency in the treatment of similarly situated parties.  Consider 
removal of a similar multiple party, minimally diverse action (albeit, one naming fewer than 
one hundred plaintiffs, though no less federal in nature than a CAFA suit) on grounds of 
fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs.  Whereas under CAFA the district court can exercise 
jurisdiction only over those individual plaintiffs whose claims meet the $75,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement, § 1332(d)(11)(B), in multiple plaintiff cases in which the adverse 
parties are completely diverse, the Supreme Court has ruled that the district courts may 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of properly joined plaintiffs, even when 
those claims do not meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.  Exxon Mobil 
Corp., 545 U.S. at 557–67 (construing supplemental jurisdiction provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 (2006) and joinder Rules 20 and 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).  Thus, 
under CAFA the court can exercise jurisdiction over all minimally diverse parties so long as 
each meets the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, but when complete diversity 
exists, the amount-in-controversy requirement need not be met by all parties joined to an 
action. 
 125. Compare the purported rationale behind enacting CAFA: 
Multiple class action cases purporting to assert the same claims on behalf of the 
same people often proceed simultaneously in different state courts, causing 
judicial inefficiencies and promoting collusive activity. Finally, many state 
courts freely issue rulings in class action cases that have nationwide 
ramifications, sometimes overturning well-established laws and policies of 
other jurisdictions. 
S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6, 2005 WL 627977.  
This result further contradicts the interpretation given to other related jurisdictional 
provisions—in particular, the supplemental jurisdiction statute (a logical analogue to the 
expansive breadth of CAFA, which includes the claims of both named and unnamed class 
members in the class action setting, and all “persons” for purposes of the mass action 
removal provision).  Using language that could apply equally to CAFA, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that “the [supplemental] jurisdictional statutes should be read broadly, on 
the assumption that in this context Congress intended to authorize courts to exercise their 
full Article III power to dispose of an entire action before the court [which] comprises but 
one constitutional case.”  Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nonetheless, the distinctions in treatment of 
virtually identical mass actions remain. 
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combat pleading gamesmanship and provide a federal forum to national 
suits. 
In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard argument in 
Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., in which 664 West African foreign nationals 
alleged injuries resulting from exposure to a Dow Chemical-manufactured 
pesticide while working on plantations in two Ivory Coast villages.126  
Although originally brought as seven identical lawsuits, none of which 
named one hundred or more plaintiffs, defendant Dow Chemical removed 
each, in part, on the ground that “the seven actions filed by plaintiffs, taken 
together, qualified as a ‘mass action’ removable to federal court under 
CAFA.”127 
In its recitation of the facts, the court in Tanoh did not suggest that the 
seven suits were divided according to the residence of the plaintiffs, type of 
injury, or type of tort claim.  Rather, the suits were identical with respect to 
types of injuries and causes of action.128 The only “commonality” among 
the suits was that each named fewer than one hundred plaintiffs.129  The 
only logical conclusion to be derived from the court’s summary of the 
case’s posture is that the Tanoh plaintiffs deliberately constructed their 
complaints “to ‘game’ the procedural rules and keep [their] actions in state 
courts.”130  But, relying on a provision of CAFA that prohibits removal 
where the defendant joins claims of the plaintiff to obtain the requisite one 
hundred plaintiff threshold,131 the court rejected Dow Chemical’s 
interpretation of CAFA and affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
remand.132  The basis for the court’s decision, however, is not nearly as 
problematic as the length to which the court then went to justify its holding.   
Admittedly, on its face, CAFA appears to reject the very type of practice 
employed by Dow Chemical to remove litigation in which fewer than one 
hundred plaintiffs have joined together in a single action.  Had the court in 
Tanoh rested on that premise, it is likely that the opinion would have 
generated less controversy and criticism.  But instead, the court offered 
multiple, conflicting arguments in support of remand, undercutting its 
                                                                                                                 
 126. 561 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 951. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (summarizing rationale behind passage of CAFA), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5, 2005 WL 627977. 
 131. The relevant provision of the statute provides that “the term ‘mass action’ shall not 
include any civil action in which . . . the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II) (2006). 
 132. Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 950, 953–56. 
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holding and giving credence to the argument that a literal interpretation of 
CAFA in this context produces a result contrary to congressional intent. 
First, the court pointed to CAFA’s legislative history to support its 
holding, despite its claim that the plain language controlled.133  Specifically, 
under the plain meaning rule of statutory construction, the court must 
follow the plain meaning of the statute unless doing so would lead to an 
absurd result (that is, one that Congress did not intend).134  The court 
violated this concept in its holding, giving credence to a pleading practice 
that CAFA’s legislative history makes clear the Act was intended to stop.135 
Once the court in Tanoh decided to look to legislative history, it was 
duty bound to look to the actual legislative history of the statute, instead of 
creating a history out of whole cloth based on what the court thought 
Congress intended.  Yet, in its holding the court suggested that “Congress 
anticipated . . . that defendants like Dow might attempt to consolidate 
several smaller state court actions into one ‘mass action,’ and specifically 
directed that such a consolidated action was not a mass action eligible for 
removal under CAFA.”136  Although a seemingly logical statement, this 
sentiment does not appear anywhere in the act’s legislative history.  In fact, 
to suggest that Congress intended to stop defendants like Dow Chemical 
from combating the very type of fraudulent pleading practices employed by 
the Tanoh plaintiffs, particularly in light of the actual legislative history 
accompanying CAFA, which focused on combating gamesmanship in 
pleading practices,137 is patently absurd. 
More realistically, the CAFA provision on which the court in Tanoh 
relied was intended to prevent defendants from employing their own 
version of pleading gamesmanship by, for example, moving to join one 
hundred separate actions into one mass action for purposes of removal.  
Because such practice was not evident here and because of the obvious 
fraud on the part of plaintiffs, the court should have allowed removal. 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Compare, e.g., id. at 952–53 (reviewing legislative history of CAFA to suggest that 
the act’s primary purpose was to curb abuses in the class action context, and therefore 
should be broadly construed in that context, but that the concern over procedural abuses did 
not apply to the corresponding mass action removal provision, which therefore should be 
narrowly construed), with id. at 953 (holding that “[b]y its plain terms” the mass action 
removal provision requires that a civil action join the claims of one hundred or more 
persons). 
 134. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 40, § 46:1, at 137–43, 157. 
 135. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 136. Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 953. 
 137. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision violated another canon of 
construction by adopting an interpretation of CAFA that rendered the mass 
removal provision obsolete.138  Following Tanoh, plaintiffs are free to 
artificially plead mass actions as separate, but related, multiple plaintiff 
suits (each with ninety-nine or fewer plaintiffs) in order to avoid running 
afoul of the mass action removal provision.  If any validity to the mass 
action removal provision remains after Tanoh, it arguably arises only in the 
situation where one hundred or more minimally diverse plaintiffs desire to 
litigate their claims jointly (i.e., not as a class action) and in a federal 
forum.  Because of the complete diversity requirement and CAFA’s limited 
grant of original jurisdiction only to class actions, in this one instance 
plaintiffs would be required to file in state court and rely on defendants to 
remove.139  Yet, this is truly a bizarre reading of the statute if Congress’s 
intent was in fact to combat plaintiff pleading practices.140 
Third, by this point Tanoh has assuredly become required reading for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys practicing mass tort litigation, as it provides a clear 
roadmap on how to plead the claims of multiple plaintiffs in mass litigation 
in a single suit without risk of removal under CAFA.141  Tanoh makes clear 
that plaintiffs can avoid the federal courts by structuring their pleadings to 
name fewer than one hundred plaintiffs.  But Tanoh also suggests that 
plaintiffs may avoid the federal courts even when filing complaints naming 
more than one hundred plaintiffs so long as they indicate in their pleadings 
that the joined claims are not to be tried together.142  This presents another 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Another longstanding canon of statutory construction provides: “[a] statute should 
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the 
provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.”  2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 40, § 46:6, 
at 230–31, 242, 244 (footnotes omitted).   
 139. Although this author disagrees that this interpretation of the mass action removal 
provision is even remotely legitimate, there is at least some logic to the practice whereby 
plaintiffs file completely diverse actions in state court, with full knowledge that they will be 
removed, in order to benefit from the lower filings fees in state court. 
 140. If true, Congress need not have limited the federal courts’ jurisdiction in mass 
actions to removal jurisdiction only. 
 141. See, e.g., Notice of Removal ¶ 1, Ward v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, No. 2:10-cv-
01881-SLB (N.D. Ala. July 16, 2010), 2010 WL 3878787 (referencing plaintiffs’ blatant 
derogation of CAFA’s precepts by noting that “[t]his civil action commenced by 99 
plaintiffs from 30 different states . . . is [1] of 31 virtually identical actions brought by the 
same plaintiffs’ counsel on behalf of more than 3,000 plaintiffs . . .”). 
 142. Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he decision to 
try claims jointly and thus qualify as a ‘mass action’ under CAFA should remain, as we 
concluded above, with plaintiffs.”). 
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anomaly in attempting to apply the mass action removal provision, one 
which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has already 
acknowledged in Anderson v. Bayer Corp.143  Anderson presents the 
possibility that the cases of one hundred or more plaintiffs could be litigated 
at the state court level, under state court rules of procedure, up until the 
very eve of trial, only then to be removed to federal court.  It should go 
without saying that Congress did not intend such a result in enacting 
CAFA.144 
III. The Minimum Diversity Proposal: Refuting Antiquated Notions of 
Federalism Offered in Defense of the Status Quo 
Given that diversity jurisdiction as currently applied suffers from too 
many diverse—and diversely applied145—rules to produce any semblance 
of consistency or reliability in application, a modification is warranted.  The 
complexities of the current diversity jurisdiction landscape are very real 
problems that have very real impacts on the federal judiciary.  Federal 
jurists have grown increasingly vocal in their pleas for revisions to the 
diversity standard to provide uniformity in decisions: “Jurisdictional rules 
                                                                                                                 
 143. 610 F.3d 390, 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2010) (denying remand of four identical suits 
comprising 168 plaintiffs under the CAFA mass action removal provision for the same 
reasons as set forth in Tanoh, but suggesting that the cases could be removed at a later date if 
the “plaintiffs (or perhaps the state court) . . . propose to try these cases jointly in state 
court . . .”).   
 144. CAFA’s legislative history unquestionably refutes Tanoh’s holding on this count.  
The day before its passage, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner explained on the House floor 
that the “joint trial” requirement of CAFA would be met by the joinder of claims of one 
hundred or more persons in a single action “because there would be no other apparent reason 
to include all of those claimants in a single action unless the intent was to secure a joint trial 
of the claims asserted in the action.”  151 CONG. REC. H729 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner), 2005 WL 387992, at *H729.  Thus, Tanoh’s suggestion 
of a separate affirmative action by plaintiffs to request a single trial of their joined claims is 
incorrect and suggests that Congress was concerned with procedural gamesmanship in both 
the class- and mass-action contexts.  Interestingly, taken to its logical extreme, Tanoh’s 
ruling supports a finding that plaintiffs could join together claims without the intention of 
trying them together (in part, on the logic that they do not “present common questions of law 
or fact”).  See Tanoh, 561 F.3d at 954.  Yet, if true, Tanoh has unwittingly provided support 
for the application of the misjoinder doctrine in the Ninth Circuit in so-called ninety-nine 
plaintiff cases (i.e., those that fall outside the scope of CAFA) absent an express statement in 
the pleadings that the claims be tried together because without that statement, a question 
would arise whether the claims truly present common questions of law or fact sufficient to 
support joinder under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 145. Puns intended. 
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ought to be simple and precise so that judges and lawyers are spared having 
to litigate over not the merits of a legal dispute but where and when those 
merits shall be litigated.”146  A return to minimal diversity (with certain 
restrictions, as will be discussed in Part IV) would provide both the 
simplicity and reliability sought by the federal judiciary. It would also avoid 
needless litigation on jurisdictional issues at the expense of arguments on 
the merits.  Further, a minimal diversity proposal has support in the 
Constitution and in the statements of its framers. 
Nonetheless, since the founding of our republic, any proposed change to 
expand the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction, particularly proposals to 
adopt a broad minimum diversity standard, has routinely been met with and 
defeated by the rejoinder of federalism (e.g., having the federal courts 
decide issues of state law infringes on states’ rights).147  This part will 
demonstrate that these concerns are antiquated notions lacking basis in fact.  
Indeed, the original focus of federalism was not states’ rights, but rather 
personal freedoms; federal courts have always decided issues of state law.   
The suggestion that so-called federalism concerns militate against—or 
should defeat outright—a movement to a minimal diversity standard fails 
for two reasons.  First, to the extent “federalism” was originally offered by 
our founding fathers in opposition to diversity jurisdiction, and Article III in 
particular, the rationale behind the original construction of federalism (i.e., 
maintenance of separate but united national and state sovereignties148) was 
                                                                                                                 
 146. In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., In re Kilgus, 811 
F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The more mechanical the application of a jurisdictional 
rule, the better.  The chief and often the only virtue of a jurisdictional rule is clarity.” 
(citations omitted)); Exch. Nat’l Bank of Chi. v. Daniels, 763 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“The first characteristic of a good jurisdictional rule is predictability and uniform 
application.”); cf. Osborn v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 
2004) (declining to adopt fraudulent misjoinder doctrine because “the last thing the federal 
courts need is more procedural complexity”). 
 147. Cf. Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the 
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1674–75, 1677 (1992) (calling for an end to 
diversity jurisdiction on the premise that having federal courts decide issues of state law 
“unavoidabl[y] intru[des] . . . [on] the lawgiving function of state courts” and that, as a 
result, “there have been increasing gaps in dispositive decisional law rendered by those 
[state] courts [which] are acutely felt by federal judges who look to the state supreme courts 
to enunciate the governing principles” on the relevant state law). 
 148. In discussions regarding the creation of a national military, Hamilton noted the 
precarious balance of power between the national government and that of the states: “Power 
being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready 
to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition 
towards the general government.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 3, at 151 (Alexander 
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not a defense of states’ rights, but rather of personal freedoms.149  As used 
today, however, federalism no longer refers to the traditional twin 
ideologies of personal freedoms and limited federal government.  Instead, it 
has become a convenient shorthand (much like “liberal” and 
“conservative”; or “Republican” and “Democrat” for that matter) used by 
political groups to curry favor with their constituents.  Invoking 
“federalism” signifies a challenge to federal power through an assertion of 
state prerogative.  It is used by those out of power to stake out a contrarian 
position (used at times by both liberals and conservatives, Democrats and 
Republicans) to that of the party controlling our federal government, in 
order to depose that party and gain power themselves. 
Second, state governments no longer sit in a position of authority equal 
to that of the federal government.  We are no longer a federation of states.  
Even if federalism had been premised originally on states’ rights, concerns 
over states’ rights and their proper application have given way (largely by 
voter choice) to a more dominant federal government, to which we look 
ever more increasingly for authority and order in our daily lives. 
Federalism as originally conceived was intended to address and combat 
the potential for centralized government run amok—a perceived legitimate 
threat to our personal liberties.150  Specifically, early federalists literally 
envisioned violent conflict between federal government and state militias, 
                                                                                                                 
Hamilton); see also id. (“It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system that 
the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against 
invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.”). 
 149. Although “federalism” is commonly offered as a knee-jerk response to any minimal 
diversity proposal, the term is typically misapplied.  Discussing diversity jurisdiction in the 
context of fraudulent joinder, Professor E. Farish Percy restates the popular refrain regarding 
diversity jurisdiction: specifically, that it raises “serious federalism concerns.”  Percy, supra 
note 77, at 193.  Professor Percy, however, then goes on to explain the problem as the 
possible misapplication of state law by federal courts.  Id. at 201–02.  As this article will 
show, misapplication of the law was not federalism’s primary concern; rather, federalism 
addressed the unauthorized exercise of federal power in contravention of individual liberties.  
Misapplication of state law can be corrected; total overthrow of state authority cannot.  Were 
simple misapplication of state law encompassed in the same fear of federal dictatorship that 
drove the original federalist party, diversity jurisdiction would not have been included in the 
Constitution, which was specifically designed to curb such abuse. 
 150. As Professor Larry Yackle explains it, “[t]he early Americans most concerned for 
individual rights . . . envisioned a nation in which yeoman farmers would govern themselves 
at the local level while the fearful power of the central government of the United States was 
held at a safe distance.”  YACKLE, supra note 48, at 17; see also id. (“Then, federalism was 
the language of freedom; governmental power was to be dispersed in order that it not be 
concentrated at the center and turned to the ends of despotism.”). 
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such that discussion regarding ratification of the Constitution necessarily 
included talk of armed resistance to combat an unauthorized exercise of 
power by the federal government.151  Although scholars often suggest that 
protection of states’ rights (and, by extension, a state’s dominion over its 
own laws) was foremost on the minds of early federalists,152 the facts 
simply do not support this position.  To the contrary, federalists feared 
centralized authority, irrespective of the source (i.e., from the federal and 
state levels). 
No better example of federalists’ relative lack of concern over federal 
review of state laws can be found than the First Judiciary Act.  The 
Constitution did not establish the lower federal courts—an elected Congress 
created them almost immediately after the Constitution’s ratification and 
with them enacted the original diversity jurisdiction statute.153  From the 
early federalist’s perspective, the question of judicial review at the federal 
or state level was immaterial—so long as individual rights were not 
infringed.  This same sentiment is further evident in choice of law rules—
which allow that, like federal courts sitting in diversity, state courts may 
also construe the laws of other states (with binding effect).  Were state laws 
truly the sole province of the state in which the laws were promulgated, and 
thus states’ rights (not personal freedoms) the focus of early federalist ire, 
these various examples of shared judicial review would not be so 
commonplace.154 
                                                                                                                 
 151. ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 15 (2001).  
Addressing the issue of federal authority, James Madison offered the not-so-veiled threat 
that,  
should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in 
particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case . . . the means of 
opposition to it are powerful and at hand.  The disquietude of the people; their 
repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate . . . would form, in a large State, 
very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States 
happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal 
government would hardly be willing to encounter. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 3, at 268 (James Madison). 
 152. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 56, at 1177–78 (“Opponents of the Diversity Clause 
were concerned about federalism in an older ‘states’ rights’ sense: they sought to preserve 
the raw power and influence of state courts relative to the new federal courts and feared that 
the Diversity Clause would be a wedge for federal courts to diminish that power.”). 
 153. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78; see also supra notes 50–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 154. It is interesting to note that federal question jurisdiction—which many modern day 
“federalists” suggest should be the limited scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction, was 
enacted almost one hundred years after the federal courts were granted jurisdiction on 
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The “states’ rights” construct of federalism occurred much later.  Almost 
one hundred years after ratification of the Constitution, and enactment of 
the First Judiciary Act, the “states’ rights” construct of federalism evolved 
in response to efforts by a post-Civil War Congress to ensure equal rights to 
all U.S. citizens.155  Thus, although initially offered in support of limited 
federal government on the basis of individual freedoms, proponents of 
federalism later asserted it as a basis to deny individual freedoms (granted 
by the federal government) on the ground that states’ rights, not individual 
freedoms, should prevail over federal authority.156 
Over the following decades, federalism’s rationale would become 
surprisingly fluid.  The motivations for asserting federalism were typically 
self-serving, and concerned with neither personal freedoms nor states’ 
rights.157  Accordingly, because early federalists’ fear of infringement on 
                                                                                                                 
diversity grounds.  See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 48, at 18 (“In 1875, Congress finally 
conferred on the federal courts a general jurisdiction to entertain civil actions raising federal 
questions.”). 
 155. See, e.g., id. 
 156. One common post-individual-freedom rationale for federalism originated with 
Justice Brandeis, who ennobled the concept of federalism by suggesting that it established 
state “laboratories” in which policy could be tested and developed before being implemented 
nationally.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  Justice Brandeis’s construct, however, 
is not without its critics.  E.g., John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, Introduction, in THE 
NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED at ix (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. 
Weingast ed., 1997) (“For example, the long history of legal discrimination against African 
Americans demonstrates that states cannot be trusted on all dimensions of public policy.  
Competition among states is unlikely to prevent particular states from abrogating certain 
citizen rights—[including] the right to vote and to public participation on an equal basis.”); 
James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355,  357 (2008) (questioning the validity of Brandeis’s laboratory 
rationale: “[H]istory teaches us to regard with some skepticism the notion that state 
governments will consistently serve as engines of progressive social change”).   
 157. See, e.g., YACKLE, supra note 48, at 18 (noting the devolution of federalism from 
concern over individual freedoms to its current construct as a wedge used variously by 
liberals and conservatives to effect national policy from the state level: “[I]t should surprise 
no one that federalism is today a devil to American liberals and a darling to conservatives”); 
Pfander, supra note 156, at 355–56 (noting fluctuating allegiance to concepts of federalism 
by whichever political party is “excluded from political control at the national level” at the 
time); see also NAGEL, supra note 151, at 16 (“This steady and by now vast expansion of the 
role of the national government has been sponsored by both conservatives and liberals.”).  
Thus, today federalism is used to ascend to positions in the federal government on the 
inherently contradictory premise that by taking federal authority, power can be returned to 
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personal liberties did not (by virtue of the First Judiciary Act) correlate 
directly with implementation of diversity jurisdiction, and because a 
“states’ rights” theory behind federalism was one of many ex post 
explanations offered in defense of the concept, federalism should not be 
viewed as an impediment to expanding the scope of the federal judiciary’s 
authority on diversity grounds.158 
Irrespective of the motivations behind federalism, however, the reality 
today is that the states necessarily hold less political sway than at any time 
in the past and have become subservient to federal interests, such that 
federalism arguably is no longer a going concern.159  Although from a 
political perspective effecting policy change at the state level always has 
been an opportunity for those in the national minority to build a following 
and ascend to national prominence, realistically the decentralized 
government envisioned by early federalists no longer exists: 
[I]t is simply no longer credible to believe that the national 
government is restricted to an enumerated set of powers.  By 
degrees and for largely understandable reasons, the courts, the 
Congress, and the regulatory bureaucracies have gradually 
expanded the jurisdiction of the central government into all areas 
of life.  It is not possible to get medical care or attend a public 
school or plan for retirement or seek support payments from an 
absent spouse or flirt with a coworker or find a parking space at 
                                                                                                                 
states. 
 158. States’ rights as a rejoinder to application of state laws by the federal courts is 
further inapposite in the context of mass tort litigation described in Part II.  Specifically, in 
actions involving numerous plaintiffs from different states, no one state’s laws will be 
applicable, and therefore, regardless of whether or not a state or federal court presides over 
the controversy, the laws of one or more states necessarily will be construed by a court other 
than one sitting in the state in which the relevant laws were enacted.  Moreover, because the 
state laws themselves are often misapplied by the state courts tasked with interpreting them, 
any argument regarding protection of states’ rights is moot.  See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 
(2005) (“One key reason for these problems [with the class action system] is that most class 
actions are currently adjudicated in state courts, where the governing rules are applied 
inconsistently (frequently in a manner that contravenes basic fairness and due process 
considerations) and where there is often inadequate supervision over litigation 
procedures . . . .”), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5, 2005 WL 627977. 
 159. Martin Shapiro, American Federalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICA 359 (R. Collins ed., 1980) (“Any discussion of federalism in a legal context must 
begin with the absurdity of federalism as a legal concept . . . .  The key feature of the nation 
state was the rejection of the medieval system of multiple . . . feudal obligations and its 
replacement by a single political authority . . . .”), quoted in RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: 
THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN 49 (1987). 
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a community recreational facility or advertise the availability of 
a basement apartment or prosecute an ordinary street crime—or 
do just about anything else—without running into at least the 
possibility of federal authority.160 
As a society, we look to the federal government to regulate virtually all 
aspects of our lives (from complex financial instruments to Barbie® dolls) 
and to take initiative to fight on our behalf at every turn.  We have come to 
rely on federal regulation of industries as diverse as prescription drugs,161 
dog food,162 and children’s toys.163  We clamor for federal intervention 
following tragedies as diverse as environmental disasters (both natural164 
and man-made165) and financial collapse.166  We grow angry when the 
                                                                                                                 
 160. NAGEL, supra note 151, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 161. See, e.g., Regulatory Information: Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http:// 
www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2011) 
(noting that the “FDA regulates $1 trillion worth of products a year” and “ensures the safety 
of all food except for meat, poultry and some egg products; ensures the safety and 
effectiveness of all drugs, biological products . . . , medical devices, and animal drugs and 
feed; and makes sure that cosmetics and medical and consumer products that emit radiation 
do no harm”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., About CPSC: CPSC Overview, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (explaining that the 
federal Consumer Product Safety Commission “is charged with protecting the public from 
unreasonable risks of injury or death from thousands of types of consumer products,” 
including “protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, 
chemical, or mechanical hazard or can injure children [including, but not limited to,] toys, 
cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household chemicals . . .”). 
 164. See Press Release, Sen. Joe Lieberman Ranking Member Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Comm., Lieberman Says Katrina Report Should Be Primer for Future 
Disasters (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction 
=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=bf6e7b3c-736c-4813-aba2-b7f68720cdcb (“In 
national catastrophes, the nation does look to the President, who is uniquely charged and 
powered to lead our country’s response to a catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude.”). 
 165. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-394T, GAO’S 2011 HIGH-
RISK SERIES—AN UPDATE: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 
GOVERNMENT REFORM 6 (2011) (statement of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the 
United States), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11394t.pdf (noting in 
discussions of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico the federal 
government’s virtual monopoly on regulation of onshore and offshore oil and gas activities, 
the need for increased federal authority both in permitting and inspecting oil and gas 
facilities, and expansion of the Department of the Interior to oversee both safety and 
collection of oil and gas revenue); Robbie Brown, Witness Cancellations Thwart Hearings 
on Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at A16 (noting the U.S. Coast Guard and federal 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement as heading the 
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federal government is unable to provide quick or sufficient fixes to our 
problems.167  As a result, the size of our federal government has far 
outstripped the size and relevance of any one state or group of states.168 
Proponents of federalism rely on various rationales to support a 
decentralized federal government.  But adjudication of state laws (and 
“states’ rights”) has never been federalism’s primary focus as much as it 
has been a convenient rallying cry to accuse the federal government of 
usurping state authority.  The truth of the matter is that the states have 
always ceded some judicial authority over their laws to the federal 
government.  Diversity jurisdiction over time has proved neither 
detrimental to individual freedoms nor destructive to state authority.  
                                                                                                                 
investigation into the Deepwater Horizon spill); cf. Editorial, Oil Drilling Delay 
Appropriate, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 3, 2010, at 18 (criticizing Florida’s then governor-elect 
Rick Scott and U.S. Senator-elect Marco Rubio for attacking the federal government’s 
moratorium on offshore drilling, designed to assess and improve safeguards against 
environmental and economic harm, as “partisan politics” and not concerned with “Florida’s 
welfare”). 
 166. See, e.g., David Greising, It’s Never Too Late to Declare a Recession, CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 2, 2008, at 21 (chronicling the collapse of the housing market in 2007, the failure in 
2008 of investment banks Bear Stearns & Co. and Lehman Brothers, and subsequent 
government bailouts of failing mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and insurer 
American International Group, Inc.). 
 167. See, e.g., Karl Vick & Sonya Geis, Calif. Fires Continue to Rage, WASH. POST, Oct. 
24, 2007 (comparing response times by the federal government to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
and wildfires in southern California in 2007 and noting that President Bush “was sharply 
criticized for his sluggish response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005”); Editorial, The Tale of 
TARP: A Good-News Story That’s Actually True, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2010, at A18 
[hereinafter Tale of TARP] (noting that “voters loathe the idea of showering Wall Street with 
their money through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).”).  But cf. Tale of TARP 
(arguing that intervention by the federal government was necessary following the economic 
collapse of 2008: “the costs of TARP . . . have to be considered in the context of the 
unprecedented emergency that faced the policymakers who adopted it [and] must be 
weighed against the costs of not intervening”); see also id. (“Financial stability is a public 
good, but it isn’t free.  TARP helped save the United States from an economic collapse and 
bought time to get America’s house in order . . . .”). 
 168. As Richard Socarides, a former advisor to President Clinton, noted in 2010 in 
response to suggestions that President Obama and fellow democrats would advocate for 
reduction in the size of the federal government: “‘I’m sure he would . . . . We all would as 
Americans.’ . . . ‘But when you are faced with these enormous economic and social 
problems we face in this country, you have little alternative but to in some ways expand the 
role of government in fixing them.’”  With Every Intervention, Concerns Build over Size of 
Federal Government, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 29, 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Richard 
Socarides), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/29/intervention-concerns-build-size-
federal-government/. 
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Moreover, as a nation we have come to expect the federal government to be 
the “decider”169 on issues affecting the nation as a whole—which 
necessarily include the types of interstate disputes that define diversity 
jurisdiction. 
IV. Balancing the Costs and Benefits of Imposing Increased Burdens on the 
Federal Judiciary 
Like federalism, concerns regarding increased costs imposed on the 
federal judiciary in the form of an increased number of federal cases filed—
viewed as the natural response to a relaxing of the rules on diversity 
jurisdiction—are often used to challenge proposed changes to diversity 
jurisdiction requirements.  Unlike federalism, these concerns are real170 and 
take on added significance in hard economic times.  But more generally, 
opponents of diversity jurisdiction often argue that Article III courts are 
unduly burdened with diversity cases; in fact, jurists and legislators of all 
stripes routinely call for an overhaul of diversity jurisdiction to scale back 
its scope, or to eliminate it altogether.171 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Buzzwords: The Decider, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at 44 
(“‘I hear the voices and I read the front page and I hear the speculation,’ . . . ‘[b]ut I’m the 
decider, and I decide what’s best.’” (quoting President George W. Bush)). 
 170. Using CAFA as a proxy to determine the result of a movement toward a uniform 
minimal diversity standard, the likelihood of an increased number of cases heard by the 
federal judiciary would appear virtually certain.  See, e.g., Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. 
Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical 
Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1751 (2008) (noting an increase 
in the number of actions originally filed in or removed to federal court following enactment 
of CAFA). 
 171. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44 (1988) (“Legislative efforts to eliminate or 
reduce diversity jurisdiction in the Federal courts come to the fore at various intervals.  The 
Judicial Conference of the United States has long supported total abolition of diversity 
jurisdiction . . . .  It has always been a controversial endeavor.”), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6005, 1988 WL 169934; see also H.R. REP. NO. 107-370, at 128 (2002) 
(noting in discussions regarding enactment of CAFA that “in 1978, the House twice passed 
legislation that would have abolished general diversity jurisdiction”), 2002 WL 388106; 
H.R. REP. NO. 107-14, at 3 (2001) (noting in discussions regarding enactment of MMTJA 
“efforts . . . by those of the Carter Administration to improve judicial machinery by 
abolishing diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and to delineate the jurisdictional 
responsibilities of state and Federal courts”), 2001 WL 244389.  Professor Larry Yackle 
similarly notes public sentiment favoring elimination of diversity jurisdiction.  YACKLE, 
supra note 48, at 47, 230 n.116 (citing support from both the American Law Institute and the 
Federal Courts Study Committee for the abolition of diversity jurisdiction and suggesting 
that the sole reason for its continued existence is the “support from corporations and lawyers 
who believe their clients benefit from being in federal court for litigation”).  Professor 
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Coupled with an increased case load, cost further becomes relevant in 
light of a historically understaffed federal bench.  In his 2010 year-end 
report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice John Roberts notes in 
particular the “persistent problem of judicial vacancies in critically 
overworked districts” as an “immediate obstacle[]” to the federal 
judiciary’s effort at achieving greater cost savings and efficiencies and 
reducing its backlogs.172 
Nonetheless, and without discounting legitimate concerns over costs, the 
efficiencies to be achieved by a reversion to a minimal diversity construct 
far outweigh its economic impact.  This argument is strengthened when 
considering that some of the most pressing problems (e.g., an underfunded 
and understaffed federal judiciary) can be remedied in other ways, thereby 
allowing for an increased number of federal cases filed.  Specifically, as 
Chief Justice Roberts noted, both Congress and the President should 
“provide the financial resources that the courts must have to carry out their 
vital mission.”173  At present, the federal judiciary commands “less than 
two-tenths of 1% of the federal budget for one of the three constitutional 
branches of government.”174  With respect to staffing, filling judicial 
vacancies has become an entirely political process, without any concern for 
the impact vacancies have on the efficiency of the judiciary.175  These 
problems stem from irresponsible behavior by elected officials from both 
parties who find it convenient to use the federal judiciary as a wedge in 
political disputes, at the taxpayers’ expense. 
Moreover, the current jurisdictional morass outlined in Part II has done 
nothing to curb the number of diversity suits heard by the federal courts.  
                                                                                                                 
Yackle further personally opines later in his text, in defense of a rarified federal judiciary, 
the unwanted result of providing federal courts the full powers granted to it by Article III.  
Id. at 96 (noting with obvious sarcasm the unwanted result of “expand[ing] [diversity 
jurisdiction] to its constitutional limits,” suggesting that by doing so “most judicial business 
would be shifted from the state to the federal forum”). 
 172. 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 4–5 
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf. 
 173. Id. at 7. 
 174. Id. (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. (“Each political party has found it easy to turn on a dime from decrying to 
defending the blocking of judicial nominations, depending on their changing political 
fortunes.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 45 (discussing the Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act, noting that, “as inflation, the workload of the Federal courts, and the 
unwillingness of Congress to solve caseload problems by creating new judgeships coalesce 
pressures are created to review ways to reduce Federal jurisdiction” (emphasis added)), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6005, 1988 WL 169934. 
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Said differently, proof that the status quo somehow reduces, or at least 
maintains, the number of diversity suits filed in, or removed to, federal 
court is lacking.  In fact, this article suggests that because of the vagaries 
inherent in the exceptions to the complete diversity doctrine, the current 
status quo encourages parties to attempt removal, even in jurisdictions 
where doing so would appear to be expressly prohibited.176 
Even conceding an increase in costs, a minimal diversity standard will 
ensure (1) that actions are decided more quickly (without having to address 
the preliminary question of jurisdiction) and (2) that related litigation is 
consolidated before a single federal district court and handled uniformly.  
Costs can also be limited by imposing other restrictions on access to the 
federal courts that can be more easily applied (e.g., an increase to the 
amount-in-controversy requirement and mandatory abstention provisions 
for matters truly local in nature). 
A. Getting to the Merits (More Quickly) 
Jurisdictional haggling has become de rigueur in mass tort litigation and, 
save for matters truly local in nature, the question of whether removal on 
diversity grounds is possible is an assessment made by defendants in 
virtually every tort action following the filing of the complaint.  This article 
does not suggest that a change in the rules of diversity jurisdiction will 
transform this paradigm.  Defendants will always consider the potential for 
removal irrespective of the rules.177 
Adopting a true minimal diversity standard178 will allow federal actions 
to proceed almost immediately to discovery and pre-trial motion practice 
(that is, to the actual merits of the case) and to bypass the jurisdictional 
arguments that accompany so many disputes out of the gate.179  To 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 25–26, Bain v. AstraZeneca LP, No. 3:09-cv-04147-JL 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009), 2009 WL 3465064 (pleading in the alternative for federal subject 
matter jurisdiction on misjoinder grounds despite acknowledging the existence of binding 
authority in the jurisdiction rejecting the argument (citing Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 
F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009))). 
 177. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 156, at 368 (citing authority for the proposition that 
“[e]mpirical studies confirm . . . that the removal of cases from state to federal court tends to 
reduce win rates for plaintiffs [and] that this reduction in win rates is not likely to have been 
influenced by case selection effects that often obscure the implications of win rate data”). 
 178. That is, a revision to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to provide that “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions” in which any one party is a citizen of a state 
different from any one adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 179. Although discussing the situation of propriety of remand on procedural defect, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit offers a criticism 
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demonstrate, in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp., more than one and a 
half years elapsed from the time of removal to the time the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed propriety of removal under the 
misjoinder standard.180  During this time, no merits discovery could be 
conducted and the case was no closer to resolution than when originally 
filed.  By comparison, for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2010, 
the median time interval from filing to disposition for all cases filed in the 
federal district courts was eight months.181  Tapscott remained in limbo for 
more than twice the period of time during which more than 100,000 federal 
cases were filed and resolved in the past year.182  This is not to say that the 
complex questions of law and fact in Tapscott could have been resolved in 
eight or even eighteen months, but rather that those eighteen months could 
have been better spent addressing the merits of the case as opposed to 
determining the court in which the proceedings would be tried. 
Even in cases in which the jurisdictional question is decided more 
quickly, precious time is nonetheless wasted on the question of “where 
litigation shall proceed.”183  For example, in recent litigation in the 
Southern District of Illinois, in which the court raised the question of 
subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion and relied on recent precedent 
directly on point to reject defendants’ argument for removal on misjoinder 
grounds, three months elapsed from the time of filing of the complaint to 
the district court’s order.184  Had a minimal diversity standard been applied 
from the outset (and questions of jurisdiction avoided), in that same three 
                                                                                                                 
easily applied to disputes over diversity jurisdiction more generally: “The [jurisdictional 
analysis] in this case has stopped this litigation dead in its tracks. It should now get back 
under way, and in federal court.”  In re Cont’l Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 180. 77 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. 
Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 181. U.S. District Courts—Median Time Intervals from Filing to Disposition of Civil 
Cases Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 12-Month Period 
Ending March 31, 2010, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscou 
rts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/C05Mar10.pdf (last visited Mar. 
10, 2011). 
 182. Id.  The Tapscott time to resolution is not an anomaly, but rather the norm.  See, 
e.g., Anderson v. Bayer Corp., 610 F.3d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (elapsing approximately 
ten months from time of filing to resolution of the question of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction); Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2009) (elapsing thirty 
months from time of filing to resolution on jurisdiction question). 
 183. In re Cont’l Cas. Co., 29 F.3d at 295 (noting the importance of procedural rules that 
“prevent[] extended litigation that does no more than determine where litigation shall 
proceed”). 
 184. Baker v. Johnson & Johnson, 709 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681, 686–87 (S.D. Ill. 2010). 
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month span the parties at a minimum would have been required to meet and 
confer on the nature of the claims and defenses, prepare and submit to the 
court a discovery plan and scheduling order, exchange initial disclosures, 
and possibly exchange discovery requests and notice depositions.185 
At a minimum, the question of efficiencies resulting from this proposed 
standard requires investigation, if for no other reason than to rule out 
minimal diversity as a legitimate response to the jurisdictional problems 
outlined above. 
B. Giving “Teeth” to Mass Tort Legislation 
Adopting a minimal diversity construct further will ensure that, as the 
framers intended, an entire action is heard by a single, federal court.186  
Under the current landscape, although the misjoinder rule has been applied 
to provide for federal jurisdiction in cases in which minimal diversity 
exists, the federal court can retain jurisdiction only over those parties who 
are completely diverse to defendants (i.e., mis- or fraudulently-joined 
parties are severed and dismissed from the action, and to the extent claims 
against those parties are refiled, refiling must occur in state court).187  This 
current limitation on the exercise of diversity jurisdiction guarantees that 
parallel actions will proceed simultaneously in federal and state courts—
risking inconsistent treatment of identically situated parties.188  This result 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (d), (f). 
 186. See supra notes 3, 26, 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Chaney v. Gate Pharm., No. Civ.A. 98-20478, 1203, 1999 WL 554584, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1999) (noting that “[b]ecause the court finds that the Plaintiffs that 
destroy diversity jurisdiction are fraudulently joined it may ignore the citizenship of the 
those parties and exercise jurisdiction over this civil action,” and that “[o]nce the court 
properly exercises jurisdiction . . . [the court will] dismiss the non-diverse Plaintiffs’ claims 
without prejudice”).  Of course, in the case of fraudulently joined parties, those parties are 
by definition not proper parties to the suit and their dismissal does not truly sever one action 
into multiple suits since plaintiffs in those cases likely did not intend to (and typically will 
not) pursue their claims against the dismissed defendants.  In the case of misjoined parties, 
however, some will argue that although those parties are deemed to have valid claims 
against defendant, those claims do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence, and 
thus cannot be joined under Rule 20(a)(1).  That is, they could not be consolidated into a 
single action regardless of whether or not they remained in federal court.  Although true, this 
part will demonstrate that federal legislation does provide for coordinated pretrial practice in 
federal court to eliminate risk of inconsistent treatment, from which these misjoined parties 
cannot benefit if they are remanded back to state court. 
 188. This risk is not insignificant and has the potential for affecting the claims of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of individual claimants.  For example, in personal injury 
litigation involving the prescription medication Seroquel®, the federal court presiding over 
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contravenes the framers’ intent and undercuts federal legislation 
specifically designed to handle pretrial issues in mass tort litigation to 
ensure uniform treatment of parties.189 
Section 1407 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code provides that “civil actions 
involving one or more common questions of fact [pending in the federal 
district courts] may be transferred to any district for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.”190  Although these coordinated actions, 
commonly known as multidistrict litigation proceedings (MDLs), are 
designed to handle discovery and pretrial proceedings (with individual 
cases being remanded to their original transferor courts for trial191), they 
very often determine the outcome of the entire litigation, including the 
initial trials themselves.192 
                                                                                                                 
the consolidated federal claims noted the existence of “approximately 26,000 Seroquel cases 
presently pending in state and federal court,” and that “[m]ore cases are sure to follow.”  In 
re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2010 WL 3465151, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2010); see also Jef Feeley & Margaret Cronin Fisk, AstraZeneca Judge 
to Urge Return of Seroquel Cases to Courts, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=asXBF7VliqVQ (noting in 2009 the 
existence of more than 6,000 lawsuits pending in state courts); Risperdal/Seroquel/Zyprexa 
Mass Tort, Case List, NEW JERSEY COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/mass-tort/rsz/ 
risplist_2011.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2011) (noting the pendency of 3,728 individual 
actions involving atypical antipsychotic medications, including Seroquel®, pending in New 
Jersey state court).  Thus, there exists the potential (at the most extreme end) for many 
thousands of individual plaintiffs to be denied recovery in their respective state or federal 
court while, in the parallel action, similarly situated plaintiffs’ claims are deemed 
meritorious either through settlement or jury verdict. 
 189. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
 190. Id. § 1407(a). 
 191. Id. (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the 
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it 
shall have been previously terminated . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 192. For example, an MDL court’s order requiring plaintiff to make an initial evidentiary 
showing to prove both injury and likelihood of causation by defendant to state a prima facie 
claim (commonly known as a Lone Pine order) can drastically alter the landscape of the 
litigation by forcing dismissal of numerous fraudulent or unsupported claims.  See Lore v. 
Lone Pine Corp., No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
Nov. 18, 1986).  Similarly, an MDL court’s decision on motions to dismiss and motions to 
exclude expert testimony can affect the outcome of the litigation as a whole by forcing 
parties to the settlement table.  See, e.g., In re Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agents Prods. 
Liab. Litig., No. 1:08 GD 50000, 2010 WL 1796334, at *14–28 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2010) 
(permitting expert testimony from all seven of plaintiffs’ challenged expert witnesses but 
striking testimony from defense experts on significant issues of liability, including 
defendant’s lack of foreseeability of potential injury and opinion that injury at issue can 
occur in the absence of exposure to defendant’s product).  Ultimately, an MDL court can 
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The MDL process can only truly be effective, however, if all of the 
related actions are consolidated before the MDL court.  Under the current 
system of diversity jurisdiction, this is not possible.  The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML), which determines the creation and location 
of MDLs,193 can only coordinate and consolidate those actions pending in 
the federal district courts.  State court actions are beyond the Panel’s reach.  
More frustrating still, Congress has further decreed that mass actions 
removed under the CAFA mass action removal provision cannot be 
transferred to a related MDL proceeding—irrespective of whether or not 
they involve “one or more common questions of fact”—unless plaintiffs 
agree to the transfer.194  This requirement is counterintuitive, as it places the 
transfer decision in the hands of the plaintiffs, rather than the JPML, whose 
sole duty it is to oversee creation of MDLs.  Moreover, it runs counter to 
the purpose of the MDL statute, which provides that “transfers for such 
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will 
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”195  Requiring 
defendants to participate in MDL proceedings and separately defend against 
identical claims in a second court (albeit a federal one) promotes neither 
convenience nor efficiency.196 
Allowing federal courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over any 
action in which the parties are minimally diverse will (1) fully empower an 
MDL court to preside over all related actions in a mass tort litigation197 and 
                                                                                                                 
delay remand of actions to transferor courts until after bellwether trials are conducted by the 
MDL court of claims of plaintiffs over whom the MDL court has subject matter jurisdiction, 
the results of which can again promote settlement.  See, e.g., In re Yasmin & Yaz 
(Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-
PMF, 2010 WL 4024778, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2010) (noting, in selecting cases for 
bellwether trials over which the MDL court would preside, that “the holding of bellwether 
trials is within the discretion of the transferee judge”). 
 193. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (b). 
 194. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i) (“Any action(s) removed to Federal court pursuant to this 
subsection shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court pursuant to section 1407, or 
the rules promulgated thereunder, unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action request 
transfer pursuant to section 1407.”). 
 195. Id. § 1407(a) (emphasis added). 
 196. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(e) (2006) (requiring that a district court presiding over an 
action whose jurisdiction is premised on the MMTJA “shall promptly notify the judicial 
panel on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action,” presumably so that the JPML, 
and not one of the parties, can determine whether the action should be transferred to an 
existing MDL). 
 197. By definition, this article assumes that true mass torts are those involving parties 
from more than one state.  Further, although a subject for a separate article, the author does 
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(2) counteract the CAFA mass action removal provision (and its 
corresponding restriction on MDL transfer).  In addition, a reversion to 
minimum diversity would further eliminate the type of congressional waste 
evident in CAFA’s passage and similar legislation designed to address too 
specific an issue, when more generalized legislation would suffice.198 
C. Limiting the Federal Courts’ Workload: Abstention and the Amount-in-
Controversy Requirement 
Until such a sweeping change to diversity jurisdiction of the type 
proposed by this article is implemented, the resulting shift in the number of 
cases filed in the federal district courts cannot truly be known.  Although 
some scholars have offered statistics, which suggest that expanding 
diversity jurisdiction will necessarily increase the number of federal 
actions,199 those numbers are limited to specific contexts.  In fact, it could 
be argued that the number will not change significantly.  Defendants will 
often attempt removal under various theories of law despite the absence of 
complete diversity.200  For the period 2005 through 2008, the total number 
of cases removed to federal court remained relatively flat, generally 
hovering at 30,000 cases.201  Focusing on 2008, and extrapolating those 
statistics over the total number of authorized federal judgeships at the time, 
                                                                                                                 
note the restriction currently imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) precluding removal on 
diversity grounds in cases in which none of the defendants “properly joined and served . . . is 
a citizen of the State in which such action is brought,” and advocates that, in light of the 
arguments regarding the demise of federalism’s “bias” theory, the rule no longer has merit.  
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 198. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (“[CAFA], after all, resulted from 
years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by interest groups associated with both 
plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, following two successful filibusters, 
fragile compromises.”). 
 199. See Lee & Willging, supra note 170, at 1751. 
 200. The focus on removal, and not general filings, is warranted here because, as masters 
of their complaints, to the extent plaintiffs desire to litigate in federal court an argument 
could be made that they are able to do so by exercising selectivity in choice of defendants.  
Conversely, the number of cases removed to federal court can be viewed as more 
representative of the effect minimal diversity would have on federal filings because the 
number of removals (which necessarily include removals premised on exceptions to the 
complete diversity rule, for example misjoinder) can be seen to provide at least a rough 
estimate of the number of potentially minimally diverse cases filed in a given year. 
 201. U.S. District Courts―Civil Cases Filed, by Origin, U.S. COURTS, http://www.us 
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2008/Table403.pdf (last visited Mar. 
10, 2011). 
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each judgeship averaged 224 civil cases.202  Of those, only twenty-five 
cases per judge were removed from state court, and only six of those were 
tort suits based on diversity.203  Thus, using removals as a proxy for the 
potential increase in cases, it is possible that the total number might be 
something less than the “flood” of cases many fear. 
But even assuming the number of cases will increase, several measures 
can be implemented to ensure that the number of actions filed remains 
constant with, or is even reduced from recent statistics.  First, this article 
proposes an increase in the amount in controversy commensurate with 
factors including inflation and average jury verdicts in diversity matters 
tried in the federal courts. 
The amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases has remained 
static, at $75,000, since 1996.204  Adjusting solely for inflation, this number 
today should be increased at a minimum to approximately $105,000.205  
Alternatively, using past increases as benchmarks, the amount in 
controversy was increased one and a half times its current value between 
                                                                                                                 
 202. In 2008, the number of authorized federal judgeships at the district court level was 
1192, comprising 678 district court judges and 514 magistrate judges.  Total Judicial 
Officers―Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Bankruptcy Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2008/Table101.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2011).  The total number of civil cases filed that year was 267,257.  
U.S. District Courts―Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2008/Table401.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
 203. See U.S. District Courts―Civil Cases Filed, by Origin, supra note 201 (noting 
30,065 removals from state court in 2008, or 11% of the total number of cases filed); U.S. 
District Courts―Diversity of Citizenship Cases Filed, by Nature of Suit, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www. uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2008/Table409.pdf 
(listing 62,427 tort actions based on diversity filed in 2008, 11% of which, spread across 
1,192 judges, equates to 6 cases per judge) (last visited Mar. 10, 2011). 
 204. Congress adopted the $75,000 amount in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847.  This amount remains unchanged today.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 205. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).  Indeed, 
recently proposed (though ultimately unsuccessful) legislation suggested this very type of 
inflation-based indexing of the amount in controversy, under which proposal the Director of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts would, beginning January 1, 2011, and 
at five-year intervals thereafter, adjust the amount in controversy in multiples of $5,000 to 
correlate with fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index for the previous five-year period.  
Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th Cong. § 
103(a) (as introduced in House, Nov. 19, 2009), 2009 CONG US HR 4113 (Westlaw). 
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1988 and 1996.206  Using this standard, the amount in controversy 
calculated in 2012 would be $168,750.  A third option is to analyze and 
derive an amount from actual jury verdicts entered in federal tort cases.  
Under this analysis, an amount in controversy for the current term between 
$325,000 and $340,000 would not be extraordinary.207  Although more 
research is required, these statistics hopefully show that the current amount 
is set remarkably low and may be insufficient “[t]o ensure that diversity 
jurisdiction does not flood the federal courts with minor disputes . . . .”208 
Skeptics will suggest that the amount-in-controversy can be as easily 
manipulated as the complete diversity requirement, and adopting a minimal 
diversity standard with an increased amount in controversy will do no more 
than exchange one underdeveloped standard for another.  The point is well 
taken, which is why this article further proposes that any increase to the 
amount be coupled with a legislatively-adopted provision stating that a 
party’s failure to plead a specific amount in damages will create the 
presumption that the federal amount-in-controversy requirement is met.209  
                                                                                                                 
 206. Compare Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205(a), 
110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (adopting the $75,000 standard), with Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) 
(increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement to $50,000).  Extrapolating further, the 
amount in controversy was quintupled in value between 1958 and 1988.  See Act of July 25, 
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1332(a), 72 Stat. 415, 415 (setting the amount-in-controversy 
requirement at $10,000).  Under this calculus, the amount in controversy requirement would 
be $250,000 in 2018 and $375,000 in 2026. 
 207. The estimated median damages award in federal tort trials between 1996 and 1997 
was $141,000, increasing to $201,000 for the period 2002 to 2003.  See Federal Tort Trials 
and Verdicts, 1996–97, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS. (May 3, 
1999), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/fttv97.txt; Bulletin, Federal Tort Trials and 
Verdicts, 2002–03, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS. (Aug. 2005), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/fttv03.txt.  Extrapolating from these statistics, the 
median award for the period 2008 to 2009 will be $281,400, and $393,960 for the period 
2014 to 2015. 
 208. . Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). 
 209. Understandably, this suggestion will be met with the response that the federal statute 
in effect places a pleading requirement on pleadings filed in state court.  Although true, it is 
a necessary step to eliminate the gamesmanship played at the federal court level and ensure 
efficiencies in determining jurisdiction in the federal courts.  Moreover, this concept is not 
foreign to experienced litigators, and in fact is used currently to avoid federal jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Amendment to Complaint ¶ 1, Ward v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, No. 
2:10-cv-01881-SLB (N.D. Ala. Aug. 2, 2010), 2010 WL 3878788 (providing that “[a]ll 
Plaintiffs in the Complaint amend the amount of damages sought in this action so that no 
individual Plaintiff claims more than $74,500 in damages from Defendants,” “Plaintiffs 
make clear that they seek no more than $74,500 from Defendants,” and “[e]ach Plaintiff 
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Combining the presumption with an elevated amount-in-controversy 
requirement is one step toward eliminating “minor disputes” from federal 
consideration, without imposing complex and manipulable criteria on the 
jurisdictional analysis. 
Finally, this criterion will be further enhanced, and burden on the federal 
courts similarly reduced, by a comprehensive and mandatory abstention 
provision incorporated into the general diversity jurisdiction statute.  
Already common in specialized legislation,210 this article proposes that 
courts be required to abstain from exercising diversity jurisdiction over 
matters that (1) are comprised primarily of parties (both plaintiffs and 
defendants) from one state and (2) involve claims that will be governed by 
the laws of that state.211 
Although minimal diversity as a construct is by definition easily applied 
(thus, the reason for it being offered as a more viable, and more uniform 
rule in the diversity jurisdiction calculus), it is nonetheless at risk of abuse 
if not properly constrained.  Accordingly, increasing the amount-in-
                                                                                                                 
further agrees to waive any claim in excess of $74,500 and not collect more than $74,500, 
even if awarded in excess of that amount” (emphasis added)); see also H.R. 4113, § 104(a), 
2009 CONG US HR 4113 (Westlaw) (proposing use of declarations filed by plaintiffs in 
state court limiting amount of damages sought as dispositive in determining whether the 
amount-in-controversy requirement has been met for purposes of deciding propriety of 
removal). 
 210. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2006) (providing that a court may “decline to 
exercise jurisdiction . . . over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-
thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary 
defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” and based on 
considerations including “whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State 
in which the action was originally filed or by the laws of other States”); 28 U.S.C. § 1369(b) 
(regarding MMTJA actions providing that the court will abstain from hearing any civil 
action “in which—(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of 
which the primary defendants are also citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be governed 
primarily by the laws of that State”). 
 211. Admittedly, the use of undefined terminology in legislation (e.g., “primarily of 
parties from one state” and “substantial majority of all plaintiffs”) can prove problematic in 
application.  Nonetheless, this article proposes adopting the specific provision used by 
Congress in the MMTJA, § 1369(b), because it minimizes the question of the requisite 
number of same-state plaintiffs or defendants necessary to meet the jurisdictional standard 
by tying to it the requirement that the applicable law also come from that same state.  In 
addition, adopting the MMTJA rule would give the courts a ready-made judicial framework 
(i.e., previously decided MMTJA cases) from which to extrapolate in applying this provision 
more generally to all diversity cases.  At a minimum, like the amount-in-controversy 
requirement, this issue requires further exploration to craft a precise rule regarding 
abstention that can be uniformly applied. 
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controversy requirement and requiring abstention from hearing matters that 
do not “involve matters of national or interstate interest” must necessarily 
be incorporated into any proposed rule change. 
V. Conclusion 
The Constitution provides for the extension of federal diversity 
jurisdiction to all suits national in nature.  Necessarily included in this writ 
of authority are cases involving minimally diverse adverse parties.  The 
complete diversity rule contravenes the framers’ intent by unnecessarily 
limiting access to the federal courts.  Further, the myriad exceptions to the 
rule that have developed over time, in their selective and varying 
application by the federal courts, preclude uniformity in treatment of 
similarly situated parties—with some improperly denied the opportunity to 
litigate in federal court.  Adopting a universal minimum diversity standard 
will restore uniformity and clarity to the application of the test.  
Incorporating a significant increase to the amount-in-controversy 
requirement, along with a mandatory abstention provision for local actions, 
will ensure that this proposal does not unnecessarily increase the number of 
suits heard in federal courts, but does open the doors of the federal judiciary 
to all cases of national importance. 
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